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Moore v. Texas and the Ongoing National Consensus 
Struggle Between the Eighth Amendment, the Death 
Penalty, and the Definition of Intellectual Disability 
Austin Holler* 
In Moore v. Texas, the Supreme Court clarified its categorical ban 
against the death penalty for intellectually disabled individuals, holding that 
states cannot disregard current medical diagnostic criteria when making a 
legal determination of intellectual disability. The Court continued to hone 
the rules from Atkins v. Virginia and Hall v. Florida and correctly found that 
the reliance on outdated or subjective criteria creates an unacceptable risk 
of imposing a cruel and unusual punishment on such individuals. 
Furthermore, the Court demonstrated the crucial importance of utilizing 
legitimate and modern clinical standards to reflect a national consensus as 
well as evolving standards of decency. 
In the wake of Moore, states will see many appeals from individuals on 
the cusp of intellectual disability seeking to overturn their death sentences. 
Importantly, the Court’s decision to hear any such appeals may very well be 
colored by fluctuations within the medical community in the interim. The 
addition of two conservative Justices since Moore was decided, however, 
means the rules from Moore, Hall, and Atkins will likely cease to expand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States was founded on core values and individual 
protections—embodied in the Constitution and Bill of Rights1—such as 
the belief that the government cannot impose “cruel and unusual 
punishments” on its citizens.2 Borrowing from the English Bill of Rights, 
the framers of the Constitution implemented the Eighth Amendment to 
create boundaries for criminal punishment.3 The Supreme Court often 
enforces the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual 
punishments in terms of proportionality.4 To little surprise, it has 
 
1. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 57 (1957) 
(noting the protections provided for the individual in terms of a limitation on the government’s 
power enforced by the judiciary); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as A Constitution, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991) (describing the Bill of Rights as a duality of individual rights and protections 
combined with a desire for “organizational structure” and majority rule). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); see 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE 
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 447–48 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) (“In this 
business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing 
excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. . . . But 
Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. . . . 
[I]f you leave them otherwise, they will not know how to proceed; and, being in a state of 
uncertainty, they will assume rather than give up powers by implication. A bill of rights may be 
summed up in a few words. What do they tell us?—That our rights are reserved.”). 
3. Peter Lanston Fitzgerald, An English Bill of Rights? Some Observations from Her Majesty’s 
Former Colonies in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1234–35 (1982); see also Stanley Mosk, The 
Eighth Amendment Rediscovered, 1 LOY. U. L.A. L. REV. 4, 5 (1968) (explaining colonial 
Americans’ concern about the harshness of the English justice system and its growing number of 
capital crimes); Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the 
Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 666–67 (2004) (citing wide acceptance of the fact that 
the Eighth Amendment was pulled directly from the English Bill of Rights). 
4. Youngjae Lee, Federalism and the Eighth Amendment, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 69, 77–78 
(2013). See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“A 
punishment out of all proportion to the offense may bring it within the ban against ‘cruel and 
unusual punishments.’” (quoting O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892))); Solem v. Helm, 
463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding a mandatory life sentence is disproportionate to the defendant’s 
crime and therefore unconstitutional). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) 
(plurality opinion) (arguing that Solem is incorrect and the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee 
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frequently operated in death penalty cases,5 specifically forbidding 
capital punishment for rape offenses6 as well as for murders committed 
by minors7 or intellectually disabled individuals.8 
The Eighth Amendment’s recent prohibition of the death penalty for 
intellectually disabled individuals gave rise to the controversy in Moore 
v. Texas.9 In Moore, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state’s 
reliance on outdated medical standards and its own local precedent rooted 
in subjectivity complied with the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
precedent.10 At bottom, does the Eighth Amendment allow a state, in 
devising a system for determining intellectual disability as a matter of 
law, to prohibit the use of current medical standards and implement 
whatever medical standards it wishes?11 Based on two of its recent 
decisions,12 the Court held that a state cannot disregard current medical 
standards or “diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus” 
when determining intellectual disability, and that Texas’s use of 
subjective factors was in direct violation of the Eighth Amendment.13 
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion that Texas 
actually complied with the Eighth Amendment in creating its own 
 
proportional punishments). 
5. In addition to the cases discussed herein, the Supreme Court has dealt with myriad cases 
surrounding the death penalty and once struck down the death penalty entirely as unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). See Carol S. 
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361–97 (1995), for a 
discussion of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence leading up to and following Furman. 
6. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 
446 (2008) (holding that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the rape of a child 
and is thus barred by the Eighth Amendment). 
7. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
8. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Atkins created a categorical ban on the death 
penalty for intellectually disabled persons. Id. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the holding and 
rationale of Atkins). 
9. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017). 
10. Id.; Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Texas Inmate Seems Likely to Prevail in Death-Row 
Disability Challenge, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 29, 2016, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-analysis-texas-inmate-seems-likely-to-prevail-in-
death-row-disability-challenge/. 
11. Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Court Returns, Again, to the Death Penalty and the 
Intellectually Disabled, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 22, 2016, 2:31 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-preview-court-returns-again-to-the-death-penalty-
and-the-intellectually-disabled/. 
12. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
13. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044; see Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: A Victory for Intellectually 
Disabled Inmates in Texas, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 28, 2017, 1:51 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-victory-intellectually-disabled-inmates-
texas (discussing the majority opinion’s view that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was wrong 
in three different ways). 
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standard and that the medical community itself was splintered in terms of 
diagnosing and defining intellectual disability, Justice Ginsburg’s 
majority opinion correctly applied the Court’s rules from Hall v. 
Florida.14 Without further instruction on the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of capital punishment for the intellectually disabled, as 
provided by Moore, states would be free to craft and retain their own 
rules—becoming inapposite with current medical standards over time—
that create the “unacceptable risk” of executing those who are 
intellectually disabled.15 
Part I of this Note begins by describing the evolution of the Eighth 
Amendment and the definition of cruel and unusual punishment in the 
United States.16 Part I continues with an account of the Supreme Court’s 
recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding intellectual disability 
and the death penalty, as well as Texas’s response to the Court’s rule from 
Atkins v. Virginia.17 Next, Part II outlines the factual and procedural 
history of Moore and discusses the Court’s decision as well as Chief 
Justice Roberts’s dissent.18 Part III analyzes why the majority in Moore 
was correct and in line with the Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent, 
discusses the medical community’s importance in determinations of 
intellectual disability, and explains why Texas’s legal standard for 
intellectual disability is irreconcilable with both Hall and Atkins.19 
Finally, Part IV discusses the possible impact of Moore, including how 
states will now have even more difficulty imposing the death penalty, 
how this decision will shape future Eighth Amendment and national 
consensus inquiries, and how the Court might address broader death 
penalty issues in the future.20 
I.  THE EVOLVING DEFINITION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
The Eighth Amendment is a safeguard against governmental overreach 
 
14. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (asserting Hall stands for the proposition that current medical 
standards cannot be disregarded in a legal determination of intellectual disability, and that when an 
IQ score is near but above seventy, the duly recognized standard error of measurement must be 
accounted for); see Hall, 572 U.S. at 721–22 (clarifying that, although the views of medical experts 
do not strictly demand adherence during a court’s determination of intellectual disability, the 
determination must be properly informed by the medical community’s diagnostic structures and 
standards). 
15. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 704). 
16. See infra Part I.A (discussing the Eighth Amendment generally, and what it means today). 
17. See infra Part I.B (explaining the categorical ban from Atkins, how it was implemented in 
Texas by Ex parte Briseno, and how it was fine-tuned by Hall). 
18. See infra Part II (discussing Moore v. Texas, the case at issue in this Note). 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
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and a protector of human dignity.21 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
held that the Amendment itself must continue to mature with society and 
gather its meaning from “evolving standards of decency.”22 To that end, 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are patently 
excessive.23 A punishment is categorically excessive and thus barred 
when it either makes no discernible contribution to the goals of 
punishment or is clearly disproportionate to the crime itself.24 Further, 
discrete categories of individuals may be exempted from specific types 
of punishment, such as the death penalty, no matter what the 
circumstance.25 For consistency and clarity, the Court attempts to 
adjudicate Eighth Amendment cases objectively.26 In doing so, it 
highlights the importance of decisions not being based on the subjective 
beliefs of a justice or justices—whether in appearance or actuality—and 
that the Court can meet this goal by looking to the societal attitude toward 
a particular punishment, recent legislation, and juries’ sentencing 
decisions.27 This Part will first discuss the general progression of the 
Supreme Court’s cruel and unusual punishments jurisprudence and will 
then focus on recent developments surrounding the prohibition of capital 
punishment for intellectually disabled persons. 
 
21. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even those convicted of heinous 
crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all 
persons.”). 
22. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–61 (“To implement this framework 
we have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to ‘the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so 
disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01)). 
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); 
see also Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 
677, 679 (2005) (discussing a line of cases in which otherwise allowable punishments were 
analyzed for excessiveness in light of the crime committed). 
24. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (“[T]he punishment must not 
involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”). 
25. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798–99 (1982) (finding an individual who did not kill 
or intend to kill to be categorically different in terms of culpability from those who did so in a 
felony murder case); Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Defending Categorical Exemptions to the 
Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA’s Resolutions Concerning the Execution of Juveniles and 
Persons with Mental Retardation, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (1998) (noting 
proportionality analysis sometimes presents difficulties in creating categorical exemptions). 
26. Lee, supra note 23, at 689; Victor L. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment 
of Juveniles, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986). 
27. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
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A.  Proportionality and National Consensus Review 
Well before the cruel and unusual punishments clause was interpreted 
to forbid punishments that the Supreme Court deemed excessive or 
disproportionate, torture and other barbaric punishments were 
prohibited.28 In fact, because the Amendment was almost wholly copied 
from England, it appeared, in the early days of the nation, that was all that 
it disallowed.29 The Supreme Court eventually declared that it meant 
more, however, in the landmark case Weems v. United States in 1910: 
“The clause of the Constitution . . . is not fastened to the obsolete but may 
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane 
justice.”30 Weems was the earliest Eighth Amendment decision based on 
proportionality; the Court noted the fundamental “precept of justice” that 
one’s punishment ought to be proportioned to one’s crime.31 
Later, in Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court addressed whether a 
punishment was contrary to principles of civilized treatment under the 
Eighth Amendment.32 Trop specifically focused on the nature of the 
punishment itself as excessive, being inherently violative of the dignity 
of man.33 In announcing this new protection under the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court continued its expansion and guaranteed it would 
not remain static, but rather evolve with the nation’s sensibilities.34 As 
such, punishments are to be judged not only for proportionality, but also 
for fairness in light of human dignity and our “evolving standards of 
decency” under the Eighth Amendment.35 
 
28. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (commenting on old forms of 
punishment now deemed to be barbaric and clearly excessive, such as quartering, burning alive, 
dissection, and disembowelment). 
29. Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward A Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the 
Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 839 (1972); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 966 (1991) (noting that Americans at the time may have viewed it the same as the English 
did). 
30. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). In Weems, the Supreme Court held a 
fifteen-year prison sentence, combined with hard labor while chained from wrist to ankle, to be 
cruel and unusual for the crime of falsifying an official document. Id. at 381. 
31. Id. at 367; Lee, supra note 23, at 687–88; see also Mosk, supra note 3, at 10 (highlighting 
the importance of the Weems decision as it relates to a more expansive view of the Eighth 
Amendment prohibiting “pervasive cruelty” outside the scope of actual torture); Wheeler, supra 
note 29, at 842 (noting that Weems stands for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment limits 
both the amount and nature of punishment; the opinion’s use of cruel and excessive are often 
conflated with disproportionality). 
32. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). 
33. Id. at 100; see also Wheeler, supra note 29, at 841 (noting that the Court did not utilize the 
inhuman test or the unnecessary test to strike down the punishment in Trop). 
34. Trop, 536 U.S. at 100–01; see also Ronald Turner, The Juvenile Death Penalty and the 
Court’s Consensus-Plus Eighth Amendment, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 157, 159 (2006) 
(describing the Court’s “evolving standards of decency” test from Trop as still-governing). 
35. Trop, 536 U.S. at 101; Wheeler, supra note 29, at 841–42 (noting the availability of multiple 
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After broadening its substantive scope, the Court then extended the 
Eighth Amendment’s reach by applying it to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 Robinson v. California, 
decided in 1962, was the first case in which the Court applied the Eighth 
Amendment to the states,37 and the proverbial floodgates opened 
afterward.38 Significantly, the Court saw a deluge of cases focusing on 
capital punishment and the Eighth Amendment.39 Looking both to 
national consensus40 and proportionality,41 the Court has since prohibited 
or limited the death penalty for many crimes.42 
B.  Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty 
While the Eighth Amendment and the death penalty were experiencing 
a proportionality review renaissance, questions relating to the basic 
principles of culpability, retribution, and deterrence were also at the 
 
tests that have been used by the Court). 
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); see Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 
459, 462 (1947) (assuming arguendo, but not making an actual constitutional holding, that 
violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments also violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Robinson 
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding California’s law under which the defendant was 
sentenced to ninety days imprisonment merely for having an illness—being addicted to drugs—
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Rumann, supra note 3, 
at 665 (noting the infrequency with which the Supreme Court wielded the Eighth Amendment 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
invoked). 
37. Lee, supra note 23, at 688 n.42; Rumann, supra note 3, at 665 n.27. But see Mosk, supra 
note 3, at 8–9 (arguing that the Court in Robinson never explicitly held that the Eighth Amendment 
applies to the States but conceding that it is likely because the case dealt with a state statute, and 
the Court assumed as much throughout the opinion). 
38. Rumann, supra note 3, at 666; Arthur B. Berger, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: An Unsatisfying 
Attempt at Resolving the Imbroglio of Eighth Amendment Prisoners’ Rights Standards, 1992 UTAH 
L. REV. 565, 570–71; see also Lee, supra note 23, at 688–89 (discussing the Court’s significant 
death penalty jurisprudence under Weems that did not occur until after the Court decided Robinson 
in 1962). 
39. Lee, supra note 23, at 689; see generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5 (discussing 
constitutional regulation of capital punishment for the two decades following Furman v. Georgia). 
40. Lee, supra note 23, at 689; see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 375 (asserting that 
consensus analysis may be a subsection of the overall proportionality analysis). 
41. Lee, supra note 23, at 689–90; see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 375–78 (explaining 
that the Court’s proportionality review of death penalty cases has been the most significant part of 
its narrowing doctrine; that is, limiting capital punishment only to those who are most deserving). 
42. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (disallowing the death penalty for rape); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (disallowing the death penalty for aiding and abetting under a felony 
murder statute); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (disallowing the death penalty for 
murder committed by a defendant under the age of sixteen); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (disallowing the death penalty for murders committed by a defendant under the age of 
eighteen); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) (stating, in dicta, that the death 
penalty should not be applied in situations where an individual’s life was not taken). 
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forefront.43 With several other crimes and classes of individuals 
considered at this time,44 so too did the issue of intellectually disabled 
persons and capital punishment arise with Penry v. Lynaugh.45 Notably, 
intellectual disability was not always granted the same protections and 
exemptions as mental illness, as they were frequently and improperly 
conflated.46 Although the appeal in Penry failed, it set the stage for future 
cases to address the national consensus regarding whether capital 
punishment was appropriate for those with an intellectual disability.47 
In Penry, the Supreme Court addressed two separate questions when 
reviewing the petitioner’s death penalty appeal.48 The question most 
pertinent to this Note asked whether it is cruel and unusual punishment 
in terms of proportionality to execute an intellectually disabled49 
 
43. Lee, supra note 23, at 689–91. For culpability, courts compare the defendant in question to 
a quintessential first-degree murderer. Id. at 689–90. This degree of culpability is then weighed 
against a consideration of the retributive and deterrent goals of the punishment as carried out for 
this individual defendant. Id. at 690–91. See also Youngjae Lee, Desert and the Eighth Amendment, 
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 101, 101 (2008) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment oftentimes serves as 
a retributivist constraint on capital punishment by protecting certain groups of offenders from the 
death penalty because they do not deserve it). 
44. See supra note 42 (noting several cases in which the Court has prohibited or limited the 
death penalty for specific crimes). 
45. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see also James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, 
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 416–21 (1985). The general 
existence of intellectual disability, in addition to mental illnesses or disorders, has been recognized 
by society with varying terminology for centuries. Id. at 416–17. However, our country’s care and 
handling of these individuals, both judicially and societally, has not always been in proper accord 
with their condition. Id. at 417–19. Eventually, views of alarmists and supporters of eugenics were 
quashed by experts, and courts addressed the problem of proper adjudication of cases involving 
intellectually disabled defendants. Id. at 419–21. 
46. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 45, at 423–25 (noting various internal and external 
similarities between intellectual disability and mental illness, but stressing a main overarching point 
in disability being a permanent impairment and illness more often being cyclical and episodic); id. 
at 432 (noting “idiots,” or those with severe or profound intellectual disability, are not able to be 
convicted of their criminal acts, but also that authorities have struggled to draw the line of criminal 
responsibility for those with lesser degrees of disability). 
47. Peter K.M. Chan, Note, Eighth Amendment—The Death Penalty and the Mentally Retarded 
Criminal: Fairness, Culpability, and Death, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1211, 1233 (1990); 
see also Cynthia Han, “Evolving Standards of Decency”: Legislative and Judicial Developments 
Leading to Atkins v. Virginia, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 469, 470 (2002) (noting the possibly 
strategic mentioning in Penry of a putative national consensus against the practice in the future, 
shortly followed in time by sweeping state legislative action doing just so). 
48. Penry, 492 U.S. at 313; see also Michael P. DeGrandis, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Nothing 
Left of the Independent Legislature Power to Punish and Define Crime, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
805, 828 (2003) (noting that Penry also raised an insanity defense at trial, which was rejected). 
49. The Court in both Penry and Atkins utilized the term “mentally retarded,” though the term 
“intellectually disabled” has replaced it in medical terminology since those cases were decided. See 
Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the 
Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116, 116 (2007). This 
Note uses the latter throughout, unless referring to publications or academic institutions, and has 
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defendant convicted of murder.50 The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
O’Connor, used proportionality review under the evolving standards of 
decency test to demonstrate there was no national consensus against the 
death penalty for this class of individuals, and thus it was not cruel and 
unusual.51 Importantly, Penry was decided by a bare majority.52 In his 
dissent, Justice Brennan argued the majority’s holding was incorrect and 
inappropriate because these individuals “lack[ed] the cognitive, 
volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability 
associated with the death penalty” and that “killing [intellectually 
disabled] offenders does not measurably further the penal goals of either 
retribution or deterrence.”53 Eventually, the dissenters’ concerns, coupled 
with an increase in state legislation disallowing the practice, were strong 
enough to sway Justice O’Connor’s vote.54 
1.  Atkins v. Virginia 
The execution of intellectually disabled defendants convicted of 
capital murder was constitutionally permissible until 2002, when the 
Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia.55 In Atkins, the Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribed capital punishment for defendants 
who were intellectually disabled.56 A jury convicted Daryl Renard Atkins 
of murder and sentenced him to death in 1999,57 notwithstanding 
testimony from a forensic psychologist that he was mildly intellectually 
disabled.58 Following a second sentencing hearing—ordered by the 
 
replaced the outdated term in quoted material. 
50. Penry, 492 U.S. at 313; DeGrandis, supra note 48, at 828–29. 
51. DeGrandis, supra note 48, at 829; see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (“The clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.”). 
52. Chan, supra note 47, at 1221–23. Justices Brennan and Stevens each wrote dissenting 
opinions, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, respectively. Penry, 492 U.S. at 341, 349. 
53. Penry, 492 U.S. at 343–44, 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
54. See Chan, supra note 47, at 1233–35 (noting Justice O’Connor’s crucial swing vote on a 
sharply divided Court when dealing with death penalty issues, and correctly predicting that she 
could be the one to tip the scales in favor of a future defendant); see also Han, supra note 47, at 
470 (noting the increase from one to eighteen in the number of states that specifically outlaw the 
death penalty for intellectually disabled individuals). 
55. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A 
Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255, 259 (2003) (noting, importantly, that although 
there was not a categorical exemption, defendants such as Penry and others might still present 
intellectual disability as evidence to mitigate against the death penalty). 
56. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322; Mossman, supra note 55, at 255–56. 
57. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. On August 16, 1996, Atkins and an accomplice abducted Eric 
Nesbitt, took the money on his person, drove with him to an ATM and withdrew money, then took 
him to an isolated location and shot him to death. Id. 
58. Id. at 308–09 (“[The psychologist’s] conclusion was based on interviews with people who 
knew Atkins, a review of school and court records, and the administration of a standard intelligence 
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Virginia Supreme Court due to improper jury instructions—a jury once 
again sentenced Atkins to death.59 Rejecting Atkins’s argument that he 
could not be executed because he was intellectually disabled, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his sentence, relying on Penry to 
support its holding.60 Noting the strong dissenting opinions in the lower 
court’s decision, as well as the substantial changes in the legislative 
backdrop in recent years, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
reexamine the issue previously raised in Penry.61 
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment, once again construed “in the light of our evolving standards 
of decency,” prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled persons.62 
The Court found a national consensus existed against the death penalty 
for such individuals, looking to numerous examples of state laws that 
were passed to ban the practice.63 The majority stated the consensus was 
reflected not just by the number of jurisdictions making this 
change—thirty-three in total, including fourteen that had already banned 
the death penalty outright—but by the consistency of these changes.64 
Finally, the Court noted that even among states where the practice was 
not explicitly disallowed, it had become exceedingly rare.65 The Court 
 
test which indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of 59.”). 
59. Id. at 309 (detailing the Commonwealth’s use of its own expert to describe Atkins as having 
average intelligence and possibly an antisocial personality disorder). 
60. Id. at 310; see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 319–20 (Va. 2000) (noting 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Penry that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of 
intellectually disabled defendants, but that such disability must be allowed to be considered as a 
mitigating factor when determining punishment). 
61. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310; see also Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 325 (Koontz, J., dissenting) (noting 
the inherent limitations of intellectually disabled persons and that a moral and civilized society 
must impute an accompanying lessened degree of culpability for those persons as well, such that 
their execution is inappropriate regardless of their crime). 
62. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quotations omitted) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 
405 (1986)). Notably, Justice O’Connor, the author of the Penry opinion just thirteen years earlier, 
joined with the Atkins majority to overrule Penry. See also Timothy S. Hall, Mental Status and 
Criminal Culpability After Atkins v. Virginia, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 355, 360 (2004) (addressing 
the three-pronged analysis undertaken by Justice Stevens in the Court’s opinion: looking to (1) 
“evolving standards of decency,” (2) proportionality, and (3) whether punitive purposes are 
satisfied). 
63. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15 (noting that, in the years following Penry, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, 
South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina had joined Georgia, 
Maryland, and the federal legislature in outlawing the death penalty for intellectually disabled 
individuals). 
64. See id. at 315–16 (noting the trend of passing such legislation being even more significant 
due to the usual unpopularity of laws that soften punishments for violent crime). 
65. See id. at 316 (explaining that two states—New Hampshire and New Jersey—have not 
executed anyone in decades and that only five states—Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, South Carolina, 
and Virginia—had executed individuals shown to have an IQ lower than seventy). 
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noted the only serious disagreement remaining in these cases lied within 
the actual determination of intellectual disability.66 In line with its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court left to the states the task of creating 
their own appropriate tests to uphold the constitutional ban it set forth.67 
Although states may have disagreed about the range of individuals 
encompassed by this new constitutional prohibition, the Court maintained 
that the national consensus reflected the view that intellectually disabled 
individuals are comparatively less culpable than those who are not.68 
Furthermore, with culpability taken into account, the Court posited that 
the penological purposes served by the death penalty could not 
reasonably be met by executing those who are intellectually disabled.69 
This was, in part, because the punitive concepts of retribution and 
deterrence cannot apply to those who lack the requisite culpability for and 
control over their actions, directly harking back to Justice Brennan’s 
dissenting opinion from Penry.70 Finally, the Atkins majority reasoned 
that a categorical ban in these cases was even more necessary because 
intellectually disabled defendants—as a result of their reduced 
capacity—are at an increased risk of being improperly sentenced to 
death.71 In sum, the majority did not hesitate to agree with the swath of 
 
66. Id. at 317. In this case, Virginia disputed the fact that Atkins was, in fact, intellectually 
disabled. Id. 
67. Id.; see, e.g., Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (prohibiting the execution of the insane or mentally ill 
under the Eighth Amendment but allowing individual states “substantial leeway” to balance various 
interests at issue). 
68. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317–18; see also Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, 
Criminal-Justice-Related Competencies in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY 
& L. 483, 487–89 (1994) (describing these individuals’ basic deficiencies in communication, 
cognition, problem-solving, logical reasoning, impulse control, and volitional understanding). 
69. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
70. Id. at 319–20 (noting the Court’s continually narrowing death penalty 
jurisprudence—reserving it for the most serious of crimes deserving of such retribution—and the 
lack of deterrence of future offenders with intellectual disability); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
343, 348 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (requiring that a punishment further the goals of 
deterrence or retribution); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (describing a death 
penalty that neither deters nor seeks retribution as an unconstitutional punishment, one which 
unnecessarily inflicts pain and suffering). But see Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There 
A “Rational Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 292 (2007) (“[A] better understanding of the Court’s holdings is that retribution 
alone is a necessary limit on the constitutional use of capital punishment. Indeed, it is hard to make 
much sense of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence without such an understanding.”). 
71. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (highlighting such defendants’ propensity for false 
confessions, inability to mitigate perceived aggravating factors of their crime, and ineffectiveness 
as a witness and as a client); Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: 
Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL 
RETARDATION 212, 212–13 (1999) (noting the recent increase in death row exonerations along 
with the fact that at least one of those was an intellectually disabled individual who confessed to a 
crime he did not commit). 
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recent state legislative determinations, and made clear that the Eighth 
Amendment “places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take 
the life of [an intellectually disabled] offender.”72 
Professional and medical communities alike praised the Atkins 
decision—indeed, both the former American Association on Mental 
Retardation (“AAMR,” renamed as the American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, or “AAIDD”), and the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) contributed to amicus briefs in 
the case.73 The dissenting opinions, however, lamented the majority’s 
shift in the way it determined a national consensus existed.74 Experts 
simultaneously opined that Atkins left too much latitude for states to 
circumvent this new Eighth Amendment protection75 and also agonized 
over the new rule “[leaving] nothing to the legislature with regard to the 
public policy choices of crime and punishment.”76 As seen in the cases 
below, the former analysis turned out to be more prescient than the 
latter.77 
2.  Ex parte Briseno 
Faced with a question coming under the Supreme Court’s rule in 
Atkins, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas (CCA) created its own 
rule in Ex parte Briseno to comply with the newest Eighth Amendment 
prohibition.78 In Briseno, the CCA—the court of last resort for criminal 
 
72. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quotations omitted) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405); see also Ford, 
477 U.S. at 405 (addressing whether the Constitution places a restriction on the State’s power to 
take the life of an insane prisoner). 
73. Mossman, supra note 55, at 263. Senior leaders from the AAMR and APA expressed 
gratitude and relief at the decision, noting its importance regarding both the dignity of the individual 
as well as the reliability of objective assessments by experienced professionals. Id. 
74. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324–26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 342–44 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also DeGrandis, supra note 48, at 848–50 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
specific rebuttal of the majority’s use of professional organizations, foreign law, and a misreading 
of the objective factors for Eighth Amendment analysis, and also discussing Justice Scalia’s broad, 
scathing rebuke of the majority’s personal beliefs leading to their own predetermined outcome). 
75. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and 
Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 732 
(2008) (pointing out the possibility that Atkins’s reliance on Ford could in fact result in states 
assuming “an unfettered license to defeat or marginalize the Eighth Amendment prohibition”). 
76. DeGrandis, supra note 48, at 874 (discussing the Court’s decision in Atkins as an 
overstepping of its constitutional boundaries). 
77. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 75, at 731 (“Procedures dictate the scope of substantive 
rights, and, in this context, the procedures adopted within various jurisdictions have the effect of 
redefining the ‘consensus’ the Court identified. . . . Perhaps the Court’s willingness to cede to the 
states the authority to craft procedures reflects its view that the substantive right extends only so 
far—that there is no clear consensus beyond a prohibition against executing individuals with severe 
and demonstrable manifestations of [intellectual disability].”). 
78. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Jose Garcia Briseno robbed and 
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cases in Texas79—recognized the Texas legislature’s lack of action in 
codifying the rule from Atkins, so it provided judicial guidelines for 
dealing with such claims.80 The CCA looked to the most current clinical 
manuals at the time, published by the APA and the AAMR, to evaluate 
the spectrum of intellectually disabled individuals.81 The court stated it 
must decide the “level and degree” of intellectual disability that a 
consensus of Texans would agree should be exempt from the death 
penalty.82 
Not wishing to establish a hardline rule exempting all classes of 
intellectually disabled individuals, the CCA opted instead to use current 
medical definitions to help establish the legal definition of intellectual 
disability.83 Viewing the medical criteria and standards as exceedingly 
subjective, however, the CCA also implemented seven factors for the 
factfinder to consider regarding adaptive behavior and functioning.84 
Importantly, some of these factors specifically ask the factfinder to 
consider the facts of the crime during the determination process.85 This 
diverges significantly from standardized criteria used by the professional 
 
murdered a county sheriff, Ben Murray, in his home on January 5, 1991, and was sentenced to 
death. Id. at 3. Shortly after Atkins, Briseno filed a habeas petition for relief, alleging he was 
intellectually disabled. Id. After the trial court concluded that Briseno was not eligible for relief 
based on the evidence presented, the CCA reviewed the record to make a final determination. Id. 
at 3–4. 
79. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5. 
80. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5. 
81. Id.; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 41–42 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-4] (describing four categories of 
intellectual disability: mild, moderate, severe, and profound); AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL 
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF 
SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR-9] (defining intellectual disability as a disability 
comprising significantly deficient intellectual functioning coupled with related limitations in 
adaptive functioning, both of which occur before eighteen years old). 
82. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6 (noting, for example, that most of Texas might agree that 
the character Lennie, from John Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men, should be exempt). 
83. Id. at 6–7 (asserting that both the CCA and the Texas Health and Safety Code utilized similar 
definitions based on that from the AAMR-9); see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003 
(West 2017) (providing medical definitions of many terms, including “intellectual disability”). 
84. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9 (“Did those who knew the person best during the 
developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was 
[intellectually disabled] at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination? Has the 
person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct impulsive? Does his conduct 
show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others? Is his conduct in response to 
external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable? Does he 
respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses wander 
from subject to subject? Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests? 
Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission 
of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?”). 
85. Id.; see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 75, at 727 (discussing how “[s]ome jurisdictions have 
sought to weave the facts of the crime into the determination” process). 
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community.86 These seven factors would become known as the Briseno 
factors and will be discussed in greater detail later. 
3.  Hall v. Florida 
Fourteen years after imposing the categorical ban against executing 
intellectually disabled individuals, the Supreme Court decided Hall v. 
Florida87 which asked whether, under Atkins, a state may require a strict 
IQ threshold score to be met before allowing a defendant to present 
further evidence of intellectual disability.88 In 1978, Freddie Lee Hall 
was sentenced to death for two murders.89 The Court had decided Atkins 
while Hall was awaiting execution, so he filed a motion claiming he could 
not be executed on account of his intellectual disability.90 The State went 
on to hear Hall’s evidence, including his IQ test results that had a range 
of scores between seventy-one and eighty.91 The lower court found that 
Hall could not be intellectually disabled as a matter of law, because 
Florida required an IQ score of seventy or below before one could present 
further evidence of intellectual disability.92 The Florida Supreme Court 
then affirmed this seventy-point threshold as constitutional.93 
In its holding, the United States Supreme Court found that Florida’s 
rigid IQ threshold disregarded established medical practice and created 
an unconstitutional, “unacceptable risk” that intellectually disabled 
individuals would be executed.94 Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, stated that the Florida rule disregarded the accepted margin for 
the standard error of measurement (SEM) of IQ tests, which is an 
objective fact in the scientific community.95 
Applying the Court’s rationale from Atkins,96 Justice Kennedy first 
 
86. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 75, at 727 (noting the tests “depart[] from those employed 
by professionals in the field”); DSM-4, supra note 81, at 46 (discussing the criteria for diagnosing 
intellectual disability). 
87. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). 
88. Id. at 704. 
89. Id. On February 21, 1978, Hall and an accomplice kidnapped, raped, and murdered Karol 
Hurst. Id. Afterward, in a parking lot of a convenience store they were going to rob, Hall and his 
accomplice killed sheriff’s deputy Lonnie Coburn. Id. 
90. Id. at 707. Hall presented considerable evidence of intellectual disability, including IQ 
scores and testimony from clinicians as well as his family. Id. at 706–07. 
91. Id. at 707; see also Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 707 (Fla. 2012) (noting that Hall recorded 
two IQ scores below seventy, but this information was excluded for evidentiary reasons). 
92. Hall, 572 U.S. at 707; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) (West 2013), invalidated by Hall, 572 
U.S. 701. 
93. Hall, 572 U.S. at 707; Hall, 109 So. 3d at 707. 
94. Hall, 572 U.S. at 704. 
95. Id. at 712–14. 
96. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (“If the culpability of the average murderer 
is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of 
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considered how states may define intellectual disability.97 The majority 
deemed it appropriate to discuss professional and psychiatric 
communities’ assessments of IQ scores and their meaning, which would 
lead to better understanding of state legislation, the lower court decisions, 
and ultimately whether a national consensus had developed regarding the 
issue.98 Kennedy further asserted that it was “proper” and “unsurprising” 
for courts both to utilize and to be informed by experts in the medical 
community when making determinations of intellectual disability.99 He 
also noted Florida’s statute on its face was not unconstitutional, and 
indeed could be in tune with the medical community’s consensus.100 
However, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted it far too narrowly, 
barring individuals with a score above seventy from presenting any 
additional evidence of intellectual disability.101 
The Court held that Florida’s application of the rule disregarded 
established medical practice in two ways: it relied on an IQ score as 
conclusive evidence of intellectual capacity, and it failed to acknowledge 
the inherent imprecision of that score.102 In addition, the Court cited a 
significant majority of states that do account for the SEM in their own 
implementations of Atkins, thereby providing “objective indicia of 
society’s standards” with regard to the Eighth Amendment.103 The 
majority also recognized the lack of definitive substantive or procedural 
guides provided by Atkins, but averred that this did not grant “unfettered 
discretion” to the states.104 Finally, the Court specifically gave credence 
 
the [intellectually disabled] offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.”); Hall, 572 
U.S. at 709 (noting again the importance of the fact that deterrent and retributive goals of capital 
punishment not being met when levied on intellectually disabled offenders). 
97. Hall, 572 U.S. at 709–10. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 710. 
100. Id. at 711. This is because the statute itself did not explicitly preclude courts from taking 
the SEM into account. Id. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) (West 2013) (defining intellectual 
disability as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18”). 
101. Hall, 572 U.S. at 711–12. Importantly, this goes against the clinical consensus that all 
information regarding a person’s condition is probative of intellectual disability. Id. 
102. Id. at 712–13 (“The professionals who design, administer, and interpret IQ tests have 
agreed, for years now, that IQ test scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a 
range. . . . The SEM reflects the reality that an individual’s intellectual functioning cannot be 
reduced to a single numerical score.”); see also R. MICHAEL FURR & VERNE R. BACHARACH, 
PSYCHOMETRICS: AN INTRODUCTION 118 (2d ed. 2014) (describing the SEM of a test as a 
statistical fact and paramount to the theory of measurement itself). 
103. Hall, 572 U.S. at 714 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)). Kennedy’s 
argument took many forms to create this majority. In the end, he cited the fact that every state 
legislature, other than Virginia, that considered the Atkins rule, and every state court that has 
interpreted those legislatures’ laws had taken a stance inapposite to Florida’s. See id. at 718. 
104. Id. at 718–19. Indeed, Kennedy argues, if the states could define intellectual disability with 
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to the medical community, claiming decisions such as this one must be 
guided by their diagnostic framework and informed assessments.105 
The holding in Hall dealt specifically with IQ test scores, which 
correlate with intellectual functioning, the first prong of analysis for 
intellectual disability under Atkins.106 Notably, in the time leading up to 
Hall, roughly thirty-one percent of Atkins claims were rejected solely on 
this prong.107 Contrasting this with only twelve percent of such claims 
failing on prong two (adaptive functioning) shows that the IQ test 
problem confronted by Hall was of critical importance.108 Many of these 
cases involved issues similar to those addressed in Hall: strict IQ score 
cutoffs at seventy,109 failure to account for widely accepted concepts such 
as SEM,110 and the use of scores based in clinically unacceptable or 
scientifically invalid methods.111 Critically, the rule in Hall opened the 
 
complete autonomy, the protection that Atkins guarantees would become null. Id. at 720. 
105. Id. at 723. Simply put, it is not medically sound judgment to use a single test as dispositive 
when performing a conjunctive analysis of one’s intellectual capabilities. See also AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 37 (5th 
ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] (“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe 
adaptive behavior problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of 
individuals with a lower IQ score.”). 
106. Hall, 572 U.S. at 710. Both Hall and Atkins utilized the same three-prong approach to 
define and analyze intellectual disability. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) 
(discussing the APA’s definition of intellectual disability, specifically intellectual functioning); 
DSM-5, supra note 105, at 33 (explaining the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability). 
107. See John H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual 
Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of A 
Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 400–01 (2014) (noting that fifty-two percent 
of all losing Atkins claims failed all three prongs of the test, while thirty-one percent of all losing 
Atkins claims had failed on the first prong alone). 
108. Id. at 401 (noting the small number of cases that failed on prong two). 
109. Id. at 402–03 (discussing how certain claimants who lost should have prevailed if not for 
the strict IQ cutoff of seventy); see, e.g., Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Ky. 
2008); Cribbs v. State, No. W2006-01381-CCA-R3-PD, 2009 WL 1905454, at *37–38 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. July 1, 2009). 
110. Blume et al., supra note 107, at 402 (discussing how the court “failed to account for 
clinically accepted concepts such as . . . SEM”); see, e.g., Hall, 572 U.S. at 712–13. 
111. Blume et al., supra note 107, at 402–03 (explaining how the court erred in its assessment 
by “credit[ing] scores derived from clinically unacceptable methods”); see, e.g., Henderson v. 
Director, No. 1:06-CV-507, 2013 WL 4811223, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2013) (asserting that the 
State’s expert testified that the highest IQ score is the most reliable based on spurious conjecture), 
vacated, Henderson v. Davis, 868 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2017); Anderson v. State, 163 S.W.3d 333, 
355–56 (Ark. 2004) (using a short questionnaire to acquire a rough IQ score and accepting expert 
testimony that deduced an estimated IQ range from scores on a test that was not explicitly designed 
to measure IQ); State v. Were, 890 N.E.2d 263, 293 (Ohio 2008) (rejecting petitioner’s Atkins 
claim, which included an IQ score of sixty-nine, based on expert testimony averring the test scores 
should be adjusted because minorities’ IQ scores are skewed by “cultural bias”); Lizcano v. State, 
No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5, 2010) (explaining that the 
State’s expert’s IQ scores were properly adjusted higher because Hispanics generally score 7.5 
points lower than Caucasians because of cultural differences rather than actual cognitive 
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door for future litigants to bring Eighth Amendment challenges against 
outdated methodologies for implementing the death penalty and not only 
because it was the Court’s first direct reconsideration of Atkins.112 And 
so arose the circumstances for the Supreme Court to hear such a challenge 
in Moore v. Texas.113 
II.  MOORE V. TEXAS 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the CCA for Moore v. Texas, 
an appeal from the CCA’s denial of relief to Bobby James Moore after he 
challenged his death sentence under Atkins and Hall.114 This Part 
proceeds with a summary of the facts and procedural history of Moore’s 
case, as well as with a discussion of the majority opinion and Chief 
Justice Roberts’s dissent.115 
A.  Facts and Procedural History in the Lower Courts 
On April 25, 1980, Moore shot and killed James McCarble during a 
botched robbery in Houston, Texas.116 Two months later, Moore was 
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.117 In 1995, a federal 
habeas court vacated Moore’s sentence based on ineffective trial 
 
deficiencies). 
112. See Bidish J. Sarma, How Hall v. Florida Transforms the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Analysis, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 186, 195 
(2014) (discussing how the Court’s Eighth Amendment approach in Hall allows litigants to present 
new constitutional challenges to outdated methodologies); see also James W. Ellis, Hall v. Florida: 
The Supreme Court’s Guidance in Implementing Atkins, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 383, 390–
91 (2014) (concluding that the Court’s new analysis includes a consensus of professionals in the 
field, not just the states, and that states can no longer freely ignore the scientific community); 
Christopher Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v. Florida and the 
Possibility of A “Scientific Stare Decisis”, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415, 417 (2014) (labeling 
the Hall decision radical in its logical and scientific underpinnings). 
113. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform from the American 
Experiment with Capital Punishment, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 764–65, 765 n.132 (2014) (taking 
note of the Briseno factors and the CCA’s dubious belief that not all intellectually disabled persons 
have the requisite diminished culpability to exempt them from the death penalty). 
114. See Moore v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2407 (2016) (mem.) (granting certiorari). 
115. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Eighth Amendment generally and what it means today); 
infra Part I.B (explaining the categorical ban from Atkins, how it was implemented in Texas by Ex 
parte Briseno, and how it was fine-tuned by Hall). 
116. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1054 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Moore and two 
others decided to rob a market in Houston for money to make their car payments. The three men 
entered the store and confronted two employees, prompting one of them to scream. Moore then 
shot the other employee, killing him instantly. Id. 
117. Id. at 1044 (majority opinion); see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 492 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2015) (noting that Moore was convicted of capital murder by a jury and sentenced to death 
based on the jury’s answers to special issues in its verdict). 
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counsel,118 which was upheld on appeal by the Fifth Circuit.119 At 
resentencing in 2001, however, Moore was again sentenced to death.120 
After Atkins, Moore sought habeas relief from his death sentence once 
more, this time in state court, by asserting exemption from the death 
sentence because he was intellectually disabled.121 In a two-day 
evidentiary hearing, the habeas court heard evidence detailing Moore’s 
purported intellectual disability.122 In its evaluation, the habeas court 
considered the current medical diagnostic standards, including the fifth 
edition of the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5) and the eleventh edition of the AAIDD clinical 
manual (AAIDD-11).123 The court used the three accepted criteria for 
diagnosing intellectual disability: intellectual functioning deficits, 
adaptive deficits, and the onset of said deficits while the person was a 
minor.124 Based on Moore’s IQ scores and expert testimony, the court 
determined Moore exhibited below average intellectual functioning as 
well as significant adaptive deficits, and submitted a recommendation 
either to reduce Moore’s sentence to life in prison or grant him a new 
trial.125 
The CCA, as the ultimate factfinder,126 rejected the habeas court’s 
recommendations and subsequently denied relief to Moore after its own 
 
118. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044–45; see also Moore v. Collins, No. H-93-3217, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22859, at *34–35 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1995) (addressing the egregious conduct and gross 
mishandling of Moore’s case by his trial counsel that jeopardized his life and liberty, virtually 
guaranteeing a death sentence). 
119. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045; Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 622 (5th Cir. 1999). 
120. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045; Moore v. State, No. 74,059, 2004 WL 231323, at *1 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Jan. 14, 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 931 (2004). 
121. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044–45. 
122. Id. at 1045 (including social and mental difficulties, understanding of days of the week, 
and knowledge of basic math). 
123. Id.; DSM-5, supra note 105 (detailed manual classifying mental disorders); AM. ASS’N ON 
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD-11]. 
124. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 27 (noting intellectual 
functioning deficits are signified in part by an IQ score of seventy, or two standard deviations from 
the general population average after adjusting for the standard error of measurement); Hall v. 
Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710 (2014) (describing adaptive deficits as “the inability to learn basic skills 
and adjust behavior to changing circumstances”). 
125. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045–46. The habeas court took six of Moore’s IQ scores into its 
account, resulting in an average score of 70.66. The court also credited expert testimony which led 
to a determination of significant adaptive deficits. Id. See also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 43 
(noting performance in three adaptive skill sets—conceptual, social, and practical—must be two 
standard deviations below the average to be considered significant). 
126. See Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting Texas’s forty 
years of established jurisprudence with the CCA acting as final finder of fact in habeas 
proceedings). 
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review of the record.127 The CCA then reaffirmed Ex parte Briseno,128 
which it continued to use to determine intellectual disability for death 
penalty cases.129 Importantly, the CCA also supported the seven 
subjective evidentiary factors from Briseno as compliant with Hall’s 
directive that a court’s criteria be adequately informed by the medical 
community’s diagnostic framework.130 Accordingly, the CCA utilized 
Briseno’s implementation of terms and definitions from the AAMR-9, 
published twenty-three years prior in 1992.131 The CCA went on to reject 
the results of five out of Moore’s seven IQ tests as unreliable and only 
reviewed his scores of seventy-four and seventy-eight.132 Next, the CCA 
disregarded the lower end of the standard error of measurement for his 
score of seventy-four, citing adverse circumstances as well as Moore’s 
“withdrawn and depressive behavior.”133 With significant intellectual 
functioning deficits thus not found, the CCA moved on to hold that 
Moore also did not show sufficient inadequacies in adaptive 
functioning.134 Finally, the CCA looked to the seven Briseno factors and 
determined they also supported a finding of no intellectual disability for 
Moore.135 
One judge on the CCA dissented, arguing that the rules from Atkins 
and Hall would mandate that they use the most current medical standards 
 
127. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046. 
128. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the holding and rationale from Ex parte Briseno, 
135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
129. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2015) (holding the habeas court in error for using current AAIDD standards in lieu of Briseno, 
which, it ruled, should hold its place as primary guidance for intellectual disability in capital cases 
unless and until the Texas legislature acts to modify the standards for such cases). 
130. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 487; see also Hall v. Florida, 
572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014) (“The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a 
medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”). 
131. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 486–87; see also Ex parte 
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7. 
132. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 518–19 (discrediting 
four of the IQ tests for being noncomprehensive screening tests, group tests, or neuropsychological 
tests, and discrediting a fifth due to testimony of “suboptimal effort” on that test). 
133. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 519 (“[H]e was on 
death row and facing the prospect of execution, and he had exhibited withdrawn and depressive 
behavior. These considerations might tend to place his actual IQ in a somewhat higher portion of 
that 69 to 79 range.”). 
134. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 520. The experts agreed that 
Moore’s adaptive-functioning fell well below the mean, but the State’s experts discounted these 
findings because Moore was judged based on tasks he had no prior experience with, such as writing 
a check. The CCA sided with the State’s expert’s opinion, giving greater weight to Moore’s 
adaptive strengths exhibited while living on the streets and in prison. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 
at 521–25. 
135. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047–48; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 526–27. 
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to make decisions about intellectual disability.136 The dissent also 
scrutinized Briseno as outdated and out of touch with both the medical 
community and society at large.137 Under these circumstances, the 
Supreme Court granted Moore’s petition for certiorari to answer whether 
the CCA’s adherence to superseded medical standards and its reliance on 
Ex parte Briseno were allowed by the Eighth Amendment.138 
B.  The Court’s Opinion 
Although the Court’s rule from Atkins left it up to states to create their 
own guidelines for determining intellectual disability in capital cases, 
Hall clarified that states are not given unfettered discretion to disregard 
established medical practice when creating those guidelines.139 
Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Moore majority held that 
states may not disregard or diminish the force of the medical 
community’s consensus, and that the nonclinical Briseno factors “creat[e] 
an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be 
executed.”140 
The Court recalled its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, noting that it 
protects and respects the dignity of all people141 and that it must continue 
to evolve along with the standards of decency in the ongoing 
development of society.142 These principles of decency and the 
maturation of society eventually led to the decision in Atkins.143 Hall built 
upon the rule from Atkins, and the Court in Moore continued Hall’s 
trajectory by narrowing the judicial playing field on which states can 
comply with the Eighth Amendment in death penalty determinations.144 
 
136. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 530. 
137. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 529–30. 
138. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048. 
139. Id.; Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712 (2014); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
317 (2002) (leaving it up to the states to create appropriate means to enforce the ban on the death 
penalty for intellectually disabled persons). 
140. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (alteration in original) (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 704). 
141. Id. at 1048; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even 
those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to 
respect the dignity of all persons.”). 
142. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 708 (“To enforce the Constitution’s 
protection of human dignity, this Court looks to the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))). 
143. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048 (noting the national consensus against the practice of executing 
intellectually disabled individuals). 
144. Id. at 1049 (“Hall indicated that being informed by the medical community does not 
demand adherence to everything stated in the latest medical guide. But neither does our precedent 
license disregard of current medical standards. The CCA’s conclusion that Moore’s IQ scores 
established that he is not intellectually disabled is irreconcilable with Hall.”); see also Hall, 572 
U.S. at 721 (“In addition to the views of the States and the Court’s precedent, this determination is 
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The majority explained that its precedent required courts to consider 
the standard error of measurement when evaluating an individual’s IQ 
scores.145 The CCA’s failure to do so put its judgment at odds with 
Hall,146 because a person’s intellectual functioning cannot simply be 
boiled down to one score.147 The CCA acknowledged Moore’s score of 
seventy-four and its SEM range of sixty-nine to seventy-nine, but 
incorrectly credited other factors from the test to reject the lower end of 
that range.148 Instead of accepting the SEM range and considering the 
second prong of intellectual disability—adaptive functioning—the CCA 
determined that Moore was not intellectually disabled based solely on its 
analysis of intellectual functioning.149 Indeed, the recognition and likely 
existence of person-specific imprecisions with an IQ test cannot be used 
to limit the SEM range of the test itself.150 The Court explained it was not 
drawing a line in the proverbial sand wherein the Eighth Amendment will 
be invoked at one IQ score and not another.151 Here, as the majority 
noted, the Court was sharpening the rule from Hall, again disallowing the 
use of IQ score as a strict cutoff.152 Further, it required courts to proceed 
 
informed by the views of medical experts. These views do not dictate the Court’s decision, yet the 
Court does not disregard these informed assessments. . . . The legal determination of intellectual 
disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s 
diagnostic framework.”). 
145. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049; see Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (noting that the standard error of 
measurement of a test is a statistical fact and holding that a defendant must be allowed to present 
further evidence of intellectual disability when his or her test score falls within that range); see also 
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2278 (2015) (finding it unreasonable to use an IQ test score of 
seventy-five to disqualify an individual from being found intellectually disabled). 
146. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049. 
147. Id.; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 713 (“For purposes of most IQ tests, the SEM means that an 
individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score.”). 
148. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 519 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2015) (“[Moore’s] score range on the WAIS–R [IQ test] is between 69 and 79. As with the 
WISC [IQ test score], the fact that [Moore] took a now-outmoded version of the WAIS–R might 
tend to place his actual IQ score in a somewhat lower portion of that 69 to 79 range. However, by 
the time he took the WAIS–R, [Moore] had a history of academic failure, something that his own 
expert stated could adversely affect effort. [Moore] also took the WAIS–R under adverse 
circumstances; he was on death row and facing the prospect of execution, and he had exhibited 
withdrawn and depressive behavior. These considerations might tend to place his actual IQ in a 
somewhat higher portion of that 69 to 79 range. Considering these factors together, we find no 
reason to doubt that applicant’s WAIS–R score accurately and fairly represented his intellectual 
functioning as being above the intellectually disabled range.” (citations omitted)). 
149. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (“Because the lower end of Moore’s score range falls at or below 
70, the CCA had to move on to consider Moore’s adaptive functioning.”). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 1050. 
152. Id.; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 712 (“Florida’s rule disregards established medical 
practice in two interrelated ways. It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a 
defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence. It also 
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with a legitimate inquiry into intellectual disability and adaptive 
functioning when one’s SEM-adjusted score is within the clinically 
established range for intellectual functioning deficits.153 
Next, in reviewing the CCA’s evaluation of adaptive functioning, the 
majority found once again that the lower court had strayed from current 
medical and clinical standards.154 The CCA erred in giving too much 
weight to Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths, rather than focusing on 
adaptive deficits as the current literature instructs.155 The Court also 
noted its own jurisprudence that has emphasized deficits more than 
strengths.156 Moreover, according to the majority, the added importance 
that the CCA placed on Moore’s improvements in prison was also 
misguided, because the professional community strongly cautions against 
relying on evidence of adaptive functioning gleaned from such controlled 
settings.157 
In addition to its overemphasis on adaptive strengths, the Court held 
that the CCA erred in determining Moore’s intellectual and adaptive 
deficits were unrelated as a result of traumas from his youth.158 In so 
doing, the CCA again disregarded the clinical consensus, which notes that 
experiences such as abuse and academic failure are actually risk factors 
for intellectual disability.159 Lastly, the Court found it improper for the 
CCA to require that Moore show his adaptive deficits were unrelated to 
 
relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while 
refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise.”). 
153. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050. 
154. Id. 
155. Id.; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 522–23 (Tex. Crim App. 2015) (noting that 
Moore was able to adapt to life on the streets by hustling at pool halls and mowing lawns for money, 
and using these strengths to outweigh factors showing adaptive deficits); AAIDD-11, supra note 
123, at 47 (asserting that even significant deficits in conceptual, social, and practical skills are not 
completely offset by potential adaptive strengths); DSM-5, supra note 105, at 33 (emphasizing that 
the inquiry into adaptive skills should center around adaptive deficits). 
156. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050; see also Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015) 
(“[I]ntellectually disabled persons may have ‘strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths 
in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise 
show an overall limitation.’” (quoting AM. ASS’N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL 
RETARDATION, DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 8 (10th ed. 2002))). 
157. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050; see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 38 (stressing that adaptive 
functioning is difficult to accurately gauge in a controlled setting such as prison); AM. ASS’N ON 
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, USER’S GUIDE: TO ACCOMPANY THE 11TH 
EDITION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF 
SUPPORTS 20 (2012) [hereinafter AAIDD-11 USER’S GUIDE] (advising specifically to avoid relying 
on behavior in prison when assessing adaptive functioning). 
158. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 488. 
159. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 59–60 (noting that at 
least one of these risk factors will be present in every case of intellectual disability). 
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any personality disorder,160 and again pointed to the current medical 
consensus, which maintains that these conditions can coexist and 
oftentimes do.161 
Looking next to the CCA’s Briseno factors, the Court held that they 
are in stark dissonance with Hall and create an unacceptable risk of 
intellectually disabled persons being executed.162 Moore explained that 
those who have a mild intellectual disability, whom Texans might believe 
should not be exempt from the death penalty, are likely to be shut out by 
Briseno’s subjective factors. But, the Court held, those individuals should 
still be protected by the guarantee of Atkins and cannot be scrutinized 
under rules that wholly invalidate that protection.163 According to the 
Court, the Briseno factors comprise the opinions and stereotypes of 
laypersons and hold no basis in medical or clinical understanding of the 
intellectually disabled.164 Furthermore, the factors are out of touch with 
the rest of the nation: no state legislature had approved anything like them 
and they had been implemented only twice by other states in twelve 
years.165 Finally, Texas itself does not follow Briseno or its rationale in 
 
160. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 488; see also Ex parte Moore, 
470 S.W.3d at 526 (asserting that Moore’s difficulties as a child were probably emotional rather 
than intellectual). 
161. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 40 (describing these mental, 
physical, and medical conditions as frequently coexisting with intellectual disability, with some 
conditions occurring at a rate four times greater than in the general population); Brief of Amici 
Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner at 19, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 
1039 (No. 15-797) (“The existence of a personality disorder or other mental health issue is 
emphatically not evidence that a person does not also have intellectual disability.”). 
162. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051–52; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014) 
(recognizing Florida’s “rigid rule” “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with an intellectual 
disability will be executed”). 
163. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051–52; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005) 
(pointing out that Atkins disallowed the death penalty for the entire class of intellectually disabled 
defendants); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“We, however, must 
define that level and degree of [intellectual disability] at which a consensus of Texas citizens would 
agree that a person should be exempted from the death penalty.”). 
164. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051–52; see also AAIDD-11 USER’S GUIDE, supra note 157, at 25–
27 (noting the medical community’s constant battle against public perceptions and stereotypes 
about intellectual disability); Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner at 
13, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797) (“These lay assumptions sometimes include an imagined 
‘list’ of things that people with intellectual disability cannot do. The activities that are supposedly 
inconsistent with intellectual disability can involve, for example, employment, social relationships, 
reading and writing, and driving a car. But the clinical literature is abundantly clear that many of 
the people who have been properly diagnosed with intellectual disability can perform one or more 
of these tasks.”). 
165. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052; see also Commonwealth v. Bracey, 117 A.3d 270, 286–87 (Pa. 
2015) (noting the use of the Briseno factors is allowed but not mandated as part of the intellectual 
disability inquiry); Howell v. State, No. W2009-02426-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 2420378, at *18 
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 14, 2011) (labeling the adaptive behavior criteria as exceedingly subjective 
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any context other than death penalty cases—juveniles in the Texas 
criminal justice system are to be evaluated by the most recent edition of 
the DSM, and students in Texas’s school systems are not assessed for 
intellectual disability per the relatedness requirement as they are in 
Briseno.166 
The Court concluded by emphasizing that states do not have complete 
flexibility to enforce the guarantee of Atkins.167 Indeed, as Hall pointed 
out, if this were true then Atkins might as well be void.168 As such, 
pointing to the importance of being informed by current medical 
diagnostic standards, the Court abrogated the rule from Briseno, vacated 
the judgment of the CCA, and remanded for further proceedings.169 
C.  Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented, 
arguing the CCA did not err in concluding that Moore was not 
intellectually disabled based on below average intellectual functioning, 
and therefore would affirm the lower court’s decision.170 Roberts 
conceded that the Briseno factors are unacceptable for use in analyzing 
adaptive deficits and cannot be used to implement the protections of 
Atkins.171 However, the use of these factors had no bearing on the CCA’s 
proper—in his opinion—assessment of intellectual functioning, and so its 
ruling should remain undisturbed.172 
Roberts argued that the majority was straying from the Court’s “usual 
mode of analysis” in cases involving the Eighth Amendment.173 
Historically, the Court has typically looked to “objective indicia of 
society’s standards” as reflected by the states to craft new constitutional 
rules.174 Here, Roberts was concerned with the majority’s near-total 
 
and listing six of the seven Briseno factors for post-conviction habeas courts to use in weighing 
evidence of intellectual disability). 
166. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052; 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 380.8751(e)(3) (2018); see also 19 
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1040(c)(5) (2018) (defining students with intellectual disabilities). 
167. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052–53; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 719 (“Atkins did not give the 
States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional protection.”). 
168. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 720–21 (“If the States were to have 
complete autonomy to define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins 
could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not 
become a reality.”). 
169. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053. 
170. Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 1054 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 714 (2014)); see also Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (noting that the Court has historically considered that legislative 
enactments and state practice are expressions of society’s standards); Hall, 572 U.S. at 714 
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dependence on a medical consensus, rather than the national consensus 
that is traditionally relied upon to suss out the meanings of the Eighth 
Amendment.175 
Chief Justice Roberts further disagreed with the majority, as he 
believed the CCA’s holding properly construed the rules of both Atkins 
and Hall.176 First, according to Roberts, the CCA appropriately enforced 
Atkins by creating its own intellectual disability guidelines in Briseno and 
following them as binding precedent.177 Next, the CCA evaluated its 
three-pronged definition of intellectual disability and applied the rule 
from Briseno in light of the Court’s recent decision in Hall.178 To do so, 
Roberts emphasized, the CCA was forced to square the Briseno 
definition—drawn from the AAMR-9—with the most recent clinical 
manuals, the AAIDD-11 and DSM-5.179 However, and quite importantly 
in Roberts’s view, these two manuals include conflicting direction on 
whether intellectual disability requires that adaptive deficits be related to 
intellectual functioning.180 As such, Roberts argued, it was impossible for 
the CCA to stay in line with both clinical manuals in order to remain 
“adequately informed by the medical communit[y].”181 
 
(reasoning that “objective indicia” exist when a “significant majority” of states acknowledge error 
inherent in IQ test scores). 
175. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1054 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[C]linicians, not judges, should 
determine clinical standards; and judges, not clinicians, should determine the content of the Eighth 
Amendment. Today’s opinion confuses those roles . . . .”); see also Stephen McAllister, Death-
Penalty Symposium: A Court Increasingly Uncomfortable with the Death Penalty, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 29, 2017, 4:32 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-symposium-court-
increasingly-uncomfortable-death-penalty (describing the Court as playing doctor more than it was 
interpreting the law). 
176. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1054–55 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
177. Id. at 1054 (noting the habeas court erred by diverging from established precedent and the 
CCA was right to rebuke it for doing so); see also Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53 
(1998) (“Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of 
whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.”); Bosse v. Oklahoma, 
137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (admonishing the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for taking it upon 
itself to assume the Supreme Court’s precedent was outdated). 
178. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also Moore, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (laying out the three facets of intellectual disability from Briseno: 
sub-average intellectual functioning coupled with related deficits in adaptive functioning that begin 
before the age of eighteen). 
179. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
180. Id.; see also AAMR-9, supra note 81, at 5 (defining intellectual disability as the 
combination of below average intellectual functioning accompanied by related limitations in 
adaptive functioning occurring before the individual is eighteen years old); compare AAIDD-11, 
supra note 123, at 5 (defining intellectual disability as the combination of substantial deficits in 
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior originating before the age of eighteen), with DSM-
5, supra note 105, at 38 (stressing one’s adaptive functioning deficits must “be directly related to 
intellectual impairments” in order to satisfy the criteria for intellectual disability (emphasis added)). 
181. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 
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Next, Roberts argued that the CCA correctly and properly analyzed 
Moore’s intellectual functioning based on scores from two IQ tests.182 In 
his view, it was within the CCA’s authority to consider evidence and 
testimony surrounding Moore’s IQ tests and to use that evidence to 
discount the lower range of the SEM.183 While the majority found this 
determination by the CCA to be incompatible with Hall, Roberts differed, 
asserting that Hall stands against bright-line IQ thresholds for intellectual 
disability determinations and does not hold that courts must strictly 
adhere to SEM ranges.184 Roberts contended that the majority’s opinion 
could only be justified by “absolute conformity” to medical standards, 
and that by fastening the Eighth Amendment to a one-point difference in 
IQ scores, the majority here was just as wrong as the Florida Supreme 
Court was in Hall.185 
Finally, by looking to clinical practitioners for guidance, the Chief 
Justice asserted that the majority had again strongly diverged from the 
Court’s traditional jurisprudence.186 The determination of what is cruel 
 
Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 487); see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014) (explaining 
that the views of medical experts inform, but are not dispositive of, the Court’s opinion). 
182. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
183. Id. “The court went on to consider additional expert testimony about potential factors 
affecting that score [of seventy-four]. Based on that evidence, the CCA discounted portions of the 
SEM-generated range and concluded that Moore’s IQ did not lie in the relevant range for 
intellectual disability.” Id. at 1060. 
184. Id. (“Hall provided no definitive guidance on this sort of approach [taken by the CCA 
here]: recognizing the inherent imprecision of IQ tests, but considering additional evidence to 
determine whether an SEM-generated range of scores accurately reflected a prisoner’s actual IQ.”). 
185. Id. at 1061. Roberts also noted that clinicians would not always hold up the SEM as the 
only way to determine the range of possible IQ scores for an individual. Id. See, e.g., Gilbert S. 
Macvaugh III & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and Recommendations for 
Forensic Practice, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 147 (2009) (“Error in intellectual assessment is not 
solely a function [of the SEM]. Other sources of error or assessment imprecision may involve the 
examinee . . . . Such factors include the mental and physical health, mood, effort, and motivation 
of the examinee during testing . . . .”); AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 100–01 (“When considering 
the relative weight or degree of confidence given to any assessment instrument, the clinician needs 
to consider . . . the conditions under which the test(s) was/were given [and] . . . the standard error 
of measurement . . . .”). 
186. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1057–58 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (pointing to the Hall decision just 
three years prior when the Court found it paramount to evaluate state practices and determine 
whether there was a consensus); see also Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 8, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797) (“Viewed correctly, i.e., focusing 
on Texas’ use of intellectual disability criteria consistent with those relied upon by this Court in 
Atkins, it becomes clear that Texas is not an ‘outlier,’ but rather stands among the overwhelming 
majority of death penalty States that have declined to adopt medical associations’ latest criteria for 
diagnosing intellectual disability.”); Dominic Draye, Death-Penalty Symposium: Evolving 
Standards for “Evolving Standards”, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2017, 2:52 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-evolving-standards-evolving-standards/ 
(pointing out the majority opinion’s single mention of state legislatures coupled with its disregard 
of a sixteen-state amicus brief that argued Moore’s request for relief was inconsistent with the 
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and unusual, and thus forbidden by the Eighth Amendment, is a reflection 
of “societal standards of decency, not a medical assessment of clinical 
practice.”187 Roberts was ultimately troubled by the majority’s seeming 
refusal to acknowledge the practice of the states in coming to its 
conclusion.188 
In sum, Chief Justice Roberts opposed the majority’s decision as an 
unjustified expansion of the rule from Hall.189 Notwithstanding the 
aptness or clinical accuracy shown by the CCA’s evidentiary conclusion, 
Roberts maintained that the reasons presented in favor of holding them 
in error here were not sufficient.190 The Court could not point to any 
national legislative consensus justifying this constitutional holding, so 
Roberts argued there was no support for this ruling other than the 
subjective views of individual justices.191 
III.  THE COURT’S CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL CONSENSUS 
REVIEW IN MOORE APPROPRIATELY PROTECTS INTELLECTUALLY 
DISABLED INDIVIDUALS FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
By expanding the scope of protection under Atkins with its ruling in 
Moore, the Supreme Court continued its recent trend of using national 
consensus coupled with professional guidance to enable the Eighth 
Amendment to evolve and mature with national standards of decency. 
This Part first establishes that the Court’s holding in Moore properly 
followed its own Eighth Amendment precedents.192 Next, this Part 
demonstrates the importance of adhering to current medical and clinical 
guidelines when determining intellectual disability in death penalty 
cases,193 and discusses the flaw in the dissent’s argument that the 
professional community is splintered.194 Finally, this Part explains why 
 
states’ consensus). 
187. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 
25 (stating the purpose of the guide is to assist in clinical assessment and treatment planning, while 
pointing out the information provided does not always perfectly align with questions of crucial 
importance to the law). 
188. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 312 (2002) (holding that the most reliable objective evidence of the nation’s standards of 
decency is reflected in the states’ practices). 
189. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1061 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. (pointing out there was no argument from Moore nor any assertion from the majority 
as to a national consensus on the practices at issue); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 
(1977) (“To this end, attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence 
history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing 
decisions are to be consulted.”). 
192. See infra notes 196, 203. 
193. See infra note 212. 
194. See infra note 227. 
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the Court was correct in abrogating Texas’s rule from Ex parte Briseno, 
which was irreconcilable with both Hall and Atkins.195 
While clinical determination is indeed not analogous to legal 
determination, using outdated and nonclinical diagnostic criteria 
nonetheless disregards the established professional and clinical 
consensus, and it certainly does not comport with Hall.196 The CCA 
violated established practice in its reliance on outdated reference 
materials and its failure to apply the proper and accepted standards.197 
The criteria for evaluating intellectual disability evolve based on 
academic and clinical progress in science and medicine.198 Despite these 
advances and attendant increased understanding, Texas continued to 
utilize the AAMR-9, published in 1992, to aid in its legal determination 
of intellectual disability.199 Next, the CCA ignored professional criteria 
by effectively shutting off the inquiry into Moore’s intellectual disability 
based solely on his IQ scores.200 Hall warned against basing one’s 
determination solely on IQ test results.201 The CCA was flawed not only 
in its sole reliance on IQ score in comparison to clinical consensus, but 
also in its dismissal of the widely recognized SEM for the test.202 
Clinical determination of intellectual disability hinges on adaptive 
deficits, which cannot be overshadowed in a legal determination by other 
 
195. See infra note 238. 
196. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 14; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712 (2014) (striking down Florida’s 
rule that “disregard[ed] established medical practice” for the consideration of intellectual 
functioning). 
197. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 14. 
198. Id.; see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 6–7 (summarizing the revision process and how 
changes to diagnostic criteria address specific strengths and weaknesses of the old methodology); 
AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at xiv–xvi (articulating the organization’s mission to build upon a 
constantly developing body of knowledge that reflects the changed construct of disability). 
199. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 15; AAMR-9, supra note 81; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (concluding that, in the absence of legislation implementing Atkins, the 
court would continue to follow the 1992 text). 
200. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 15–16; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 722 (“An IQ score is an approximation, not a 
final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning.”). 
201. Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (“It is not sound to view a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive 
and interrelated assessment.”); Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 161, at 15; see also DSM-5, supra note 105, at 37 (“[A] person 
with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior problems . . . that the person’s 
actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score.”). 
202. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 16; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 35–36 (discussing how to properly 
utilize SEM). 
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factors.203 Hall recognized the importance of this second prong of 
intellectual disability and how it must be analyzed in conjunction with 
intellectual functioning.204 In fact, the inclusion of adaptive functioning 
and deficits in the diagnosis of intellectual disability serves to prevent 
over-diagnosing and limit it to those persons who are significantly 
affected and have an impaired capacity to function in society.205 
Furthermore, the accepted analysis of adaptive functioning focuses solely 
on deficits,206 rather than strengths, by looking to everyday activities and 
functions that one is unable to perform, not those that one does well or 
better than expected.207 Without deficits, clinical professionals agree that 
 
203. See Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 7 (noting the definition of intellectual disability including analysis of deficits in adaptive 
functioning has existed for decades); ANNE ANASTASI & SUSANA URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
TESTING 248 (Pete Janzow, ed., Prentice-Hall Inc. 7th ed. 1997) (1954) (“[I]ntellectual limitation 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for [intellectual disability].”); AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL 
DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11 
(Herbert J. Grossman ed., 1973) (“[Intellectual disability] refers to significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested 
during the developmental period.”). 
204. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 8; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 719–20 (“[T]hose persons who meet the ‘clinical definitions’ of 
intellectual disability ‘by definition . . . have diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in 
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.’” (quoting Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002))). 
205. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 7–8; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 43 (describing adaptive functioning and behavior 
as the set of skills learned and used throughout one’s daily life); DSM-5, supra note 105, at 33 
(requiring, for a diagnosis of intellectual disability, adaptive deficits such that a person cannot be 
reasonably independent or socially responsible and need ongoing support to function capably at 
home, work, and school). 
206. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 14 n.16 (noting myriad guides and diagnostic manuals that focus on limitations, deficits, or 
impairments). 
207. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 15. Importantly, however, experts agree that evaluating adaptive behavior in prison will often 
yield flawed or stunted results. See DSM-5, supra note 105, at 38 (noting adaptive functioning may 
be harder to analyze in prison); Caroline Everington et al., Challenges in the Assessment of Adaptive 
Behavior of People Who Are Incarcerated, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITY 201, 201–02 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (asserting that an accurate look at 
adaptive behavior is impossible in prison because inmates do not make any independent choices 
about their daily lives, such as cooking food and dressing themselves); Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive 
Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 16 APPLIED 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 114, 119 (2009) (describing prisons as artificial environments that do not give 
enough opportunity to demonstrate adaptive behaviors). 
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one cannot be diagnosed with intellectual disability. Conversely, deficits 
should not be counterbalanced with adaptive strengths, as Texas courts 
have done, to weigh against such a diagnosis.208 Diminished adaptive 
abilities in everyday life are clinically viewed as manifestations of 
limitations seen in the first prong of intellectual functioning.209 Finally, 
the clinical focus on deficits is most important because some relative 
adaptive strengths almost always coexist with adaptive deficits.210 A 
legal determination of intellectual disability must be reflective of the 
clinical understanding, which recognizes that these commingling 
characteristics do not preclude diagnosis.211 
Next, states cannot outright ignore established scientific standards 
when dealing with intellectual disability cases.212 These standards change 
 
208. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 17; see also Ex parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 26–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[S]ound scientific 
principles require the factfinder to consider all possible data that sheds light on a person’s adaptive 
functioning, including his conduct in a prison society, school setting, or ‘free world’ community.” 
(emphasis in original)); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (using a test 
that weighs strengths and weaknesses, contrary to the accepted medical standards); AAIDD-11, 
supra note 123, at 47 (“[S]ignificant limitations in conceptual, social, or practical adaptive skills 
[are] not outweighed by the potential strengths in some adaptive skills.”). 
209. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 17–18; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (“Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number.”). 
210. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 19 (“[P]ractically every individual who has intellectual disability also has things that he or she 
has learned to do, and can do.”); see also Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015) 
(“[I]ntellectually disabled persons may have strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths 
in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise 
show an overall limitation.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting AM. ASS’N OF MENTAL 
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION, DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF 
SUPPORTS 8 (10th ed. 2002))); Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual 
Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 471 (2014) (“[T]he presence of 
a defendant’s strengths in some areas, such as having a history of steady employment or possessing 
academic skills in the fourth to sixth grade range, is to be expected and does not preclude a diagnosis 
of [intellectual disability].”). 
211. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 19–20; see also J. Gregory Olley, The Death Penalty, the Courts, and Intellectual Disabilities, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF HIGH-RISK CHALLENGING BEHAVIORS IN PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL 
AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 229, 233 (James K. Luiselli ed., 2012) (“[P]eople with mild 
ID [intellectual disability] are a heterogeneous group with individual profiles of relative strengths 
and weaknesses. One cannot argue that the presence of a particular strength rules out ID, 
particularly if it is a strength shared with others with ID.”); Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 45, at 
427 (“[Intellectually disabled] people are individuals. Any attempt to describe them as a group risks 
false stereotyping and therefore demands the greatest caution.”). 
212. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (asserting that defendants must have the opportunity to show 
evidence of adaptive deficits); Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and 
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over time with improved clinical and scientific understanding of 
intellectual disability, and courts must be able to consider these new and 
refined guidelines.213 Importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized this 
fact in other cases involving psychology by considering the current state 
of the relevant medical or scientific field.214 However, the CCA had 
rejected the accepted scientific principles, in stark contrast to the Court’s 
directive in Hall.215 Its use of adaptive strengths to support its decision is 
supported by almost no authority, placing it well outside the medical 
community’s diagnostic framework.216 Lastly, the Briseno factors are 
also outside the scope of accepted clinical practice and have been rejected 
both by scholars as well as practitioners in the field.217 
Looking to national consensus to formulate a rule, the Court noted that 
Texas is an outlier among the states in routinely depriving intellectually 
disabled individuals of constitutional protection under Atkins.218 When a 
 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 164, at 27 (noting that scientific and clinical consensus regarding diagnostic standards 
for deficits is as well established as the standards for intellectual functioning, and is also just as 
important to the determination of intellectual disability). 
213. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 27 (“Clinical understanding cannot, of course, be treated as if it were fixed in amber, and any 
requirement for courts to willfully blind their eyes to proven advances in scientific understanding 
is inconsistent with basic Constitutional principles.”). 
214. Id.; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“[D]evelopments in psychology 
and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”); 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 n.5 (2012) (“The evidence presented to us in these cases 
indicates that the science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have 
become even stronger.”). 
215. Hall, 572 U.S. at 721 (“The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a 
medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”); Brief 
of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 
(AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, at 28. 
216. Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, 
at 28 n.33. 
217. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 593.005 (West 2017) (detailing Texas’s clinical 
guidelines for determining the presence of an intellectual disability); Brief of Amici Curiae, the 
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the 
United States, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, at 28–31 (noting that Texas uses clinical 
guidelines and definitions of intellectual disability for all legal purposes other than death penalty 
cases); Everington, supra note 210, at 481 (“Using these seven [Briseno] factors as part of a 
diagnosis has the potential (if strictly interpreted) to exclude anyone functioning in the mild ID 
range from the protection of Atkins.”). 
218. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18, 
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (No. 15-797); see also Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052 (“The 
Briseno factors are an outlier, in comparison both to other States’ handling of intellectual-disability 
pleas and to Texas’ own practices in other contexts.”); see generally Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A 
Different Path Taken: Texas Capital Offenders’ Post-Atkins Claims of Mental Retardation, 39 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2011). 
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state is isolated, as Texas was in this case, it stands as evidence of a 
national consensus against the practice in question.219 In practice, 
Texas’s rule has almost certainly led to individuals being put on death 
row and has possibly led to executions of individuals who would have 
been exempt in other jurisdictions.220 
Texas was also the only state to use the Briseno factors and to forbid 
the use of modern clinical standards.221 In recent cases, Oregon, 
Mississippi, California, and Indiana have all complied with Hall in 
utilizing newly established medical or clinical standards.222 Furthermore, 
most courts outside of Texas have either implicitly or directly rejected 
Briseno and Texas’s method of analyzing adaptive behavior.223 Although 
most states have not addressed the exact question raised in Moore, still 
 
219. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 218, at 18; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 718 (holding that, where a majority of the states have 
rejected a procedural method for imposing the death penalty, that stands as strong evidence of a 
national consensus regarding it as improper and inhumane). 
220. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 218, at 18–19; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 723 (holding Florida’s IQ cutoff rule unconstitutional 
due to the risk it created of executing intellectually disabled defendants); Brief for Amicus Curiae 
The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner at 5–6, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797) 
(noting that Texas’s death penalty decisions involving intellectual disability oftentimes require 
intervention and correction by the Supreme Court). See Brief for the American Bar Association as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 218, at 22–27 for a discussion of three Texas 
defendants, in addition to Moore, whose petitions for relief under Atkins were denied because of 
Briseno. 
221. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, supra note 220, 
at 10 (claiming that most states require or at least permit the use of modern and up-to-date standards, 
while Texas actually forbids their use). 
222. Id. at 10–12; see also In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 2005) (citing to and relying 
on then-current clinical guidelines and manuals to reject a strict IQ cutoff, nine years before Hall 
was decided); Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 108 (Ind. 2005) (recognizing that a state’s definition 
of intellectual disability must “generally conform” to that of the national consensus and clinical 
authorities); Chase v. State, 171 So. 3d 463, 471 (Miss. 2015) (“[J]udicial recognition of the new 
terminology conforms with the directives of Atkins and Hall and will facilitate legal determinations 
of intellectual disability by allowing our courts to rely on the newer, generally-accepted definitions 
most frequently used by modern clinicians. We now adopt the 2010 AAIDD and 2013 APA 
definitions of intellectual disability as appropriate for use to determine intellectual disability in the 
courts of this state . . . .”); State v. Agee, 364 P.3d 971, 989 (Or. 2015) (reversing a trial court’s 
Atkins decision that did not have the opportunity to use the most recent DSM-5, thus creating an 
unacceptable risk that an individual with intellectual disability may be executed). 
223. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 218, at 20–21; see also Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 608–12 (6th Cir. 2014) (overturning 
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, which had emphasized adaptive strengths in its 
determination of intellectual disability); United States v. Candelario-Santana, 916 F. Supp. 2d 191, 
212 (D.P.R. 2013) (rejecting the prosecutor’s request to use Briseno because the factors were not 
as consistent with Atkins as other factors and tests that were available); United States v. 
Montgomery, No. 2:11-cr-20044-JPM-1, 2014 WL 1516147, at *48 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2014) 
(using the approach of other federal courts instead of Briseno because they were more adherent to 
clinical standards). 
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none have deviated in the way Texas did here.224 The only state that 
comes close is Pennsylvania, and even there, the courts still utilize 
clinical definitions first and foremost, with the Briseno factors merely 
permitted but not required in the analysis.225 In looking to clear and 
objective evidence of the practice of states, the Supreme Court was 
correct in holding that Texas’s system was out of touch with societal 
views and evolving standards of decency.226 
The dissent’s argument that the professional community is splintered 
in its diagnosis of intellectual disability is unpersuasive, as there is 
professional consensus on the objective diagnostic criteria at issue in 
Moore.227 Both Atkins and Hall recognized this consensus and gave 
authority to definitions used by the APA and the AAIDD.228 Indeed, both 
the DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11 recognize the centrality of coexisting 
intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits to the determination of 
intellectual disability.229 Finally, the relatedness inquiry on which the 
 
224. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, supra note 220, 
at 12; see also Tobolowsky, supra note 218, at 142 (“[T]he Texas Court has clearly taken a path 
that differs from the other states both in its actions and in its failure to act regarding its Atkins 
definition and procedures.”). 
225. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, supra note 220, 
at 12–13; Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 58 A.3d 62, 86 (Pa. 2012) (“Because the Briseno factors 
relate directly to considerations in Atkins and appear to be particularly helpful in cases of 
retrospective assessment of [intellectual disability], we approve their use in Pennsylvania. 
However, we note and emphasize that in Briseno the court did not adopt them as presumptions or 
even as a checklist.”); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 61 A.3d 979, 982 n.9 (Pa. 2013) 
(noting that although the Briseno factors may be helpful, they are not to be given any favored or 
presumptive status in the eyes of the factfinder). 
226. Brief for Amicus Curiae The Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, supra note 220, 
at 13; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (asserting the Eighth Amendment draws 
its meaning from “evolving standards of decency”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274–75 
(1980) (explaining that the Court must use objective factors as much as possible when undertaking 
Eighth Amendment analyses); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (noting that the actions 
of states provide the most clear and objective evidence of national consensus and our society’s 
standards). 
227. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 7 n.3 (noting that the definitions of intellectual disability used in the AAIDD-11 
and DSM-5 do differ in some respects, but those differences are not relevant to the question 
presented in Moore); see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710–11 (2014) (noting clinical 
definition of intellectual disability includes three main criteria: limitations in intellectual 
functioning (as evidenced by IQ scores), limitations in adaptive functioning, and onset of said 
limitations during developmental years). 
228. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 7; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); Hall, 572 U.S. at 704. 
229. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 8; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 28 (“[E]qual consideration [must be 
given] to significant limitations in adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning . . . .”); DSM-5, 
supra note 105, at 37 (“The diagnosis of intellectual disability is based on both clinical assessment 
and standardized testing of intellectual and adaptive functions.”). 
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CCA partially relied230 is only relevant insofar as it precludes other 
physical ailments from affecting the diagnosis.231 
Professionals also agree on the assessment methods of adaptive 
functioning, stressing the importance of adaptive deficits as measured by 
standardized tests.232 An individual must have a significant limitation or 
deficit in at least one skill area, whereby intellectual disability can and 
should be diagnosed.233 Significantly, again, there is professional 
consensus that these adaptive deficits are indicative of intellectual 
disability even when they are concomitant with manifestations of 
adaptive strengths.234 Finally, although the CCA in Briseno warily 
asserted that such diagnoses were rooted in subjectivity,235 the testing 
methods currently used meet all measurable requirements for 
standardization, reliability, and validity.236 When assessed in accordance 
with clinically accepted tests and guidelines, subjectivity is all but a 
logical impossibility.237 
Next, the goal of the Briseno factors is to limit the scope of protection 
under Atkins—in the midst of a legislative vacuum wherein Texas had 
not yet implemented it statutorily—such that it unconstitutionally 
excludes mildly intellectually disabled individuals who are deemed 
undeserving of that protection.238 The CCA in Briseno, tasked with 
 
230. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 
231. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 8–9. 
232. Id. at 11; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 47; DSM-5, supra note 105, at 37. 
233. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 13; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 47 (describing a significant limitation 
as one that is at least two standard deviations below the mean); DSM-5, supra note 105, at 37–38 
(asserting that at least one domain of functioning must be impaired so as to require ongoing support 
for the individual’s performance of everyday activities). 
234. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 13; see also Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015) (stating in dicta 
that intellectually disabled individuals are likely to have a mixture of strengths in various social 
skills or adaptive skills, while exhibiting overall limitations in other adaptive skill areas (citing AM. 
ASS’N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION, DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND 
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 8 (10th ed. 2002))); AAIDD-11, supra note 123, at 45 (noting that adaptive 
strengths are often present along with adaptive limitations). 
235. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
236. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 11–12; see also J. Gregory Olley, Adaptive Behavior Instruments, in THE DEATH 
PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY supra note 207, at 187, 187–89 (noting the ongoing 
refinement and development of testing methods has resulted in three reliable diagnostic scales). 
237. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 161, at 12–13. 
238. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner at 8, Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (No. 15-797); see also Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005) (“[T]he [Atkins] Court ruled that the death penalty 
constitutes an excessive sanction for the entire category of [intellectually disabled] offenders . . . .”); 
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creating a rule to apply the Eighth Amendment protection of Atkins, 
critically misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s mandate that the states 
prohibit this type of punishment as also allowing states to continue to 
execute individuals with a mild intellectual disability.239 After 
highlighting the high percentage of persons recognized as mildly 
disabled240 and their ability to improve functional skills with proper 
assistance over time,241 the CCA then extrapolated what it believed to be 
the professional community’s wide diagnosis of intellectual disability as 
creating a “safety net” for those on the fringe of mild intellectual 
disability.242 In doing so, the CCA then assumed the responsibility of 
defining the range of individuals to be exempted in Texas under Atkins 
and enacted a rule that empowers a factfinder to unscientifically 
determine whether a defendant is mildly intellectually disabled or merely 
has a personality disorder.243 
In enacting this rule rooted in subjectivity, the Briseno court dodged 
its responsibility under Atkins by incorrectly conflating the decision of 
who is intellectually disabled with a decision of which intellectually 
disabled persons should be exempt from the death penalty under the 
 
Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6 (stating that the capital punishment ban for the intellectually 
disabled will be extended only to those whom a consensus of Texans believes “should be” exempt 
from the death penalty); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 528 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Alcala, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority in Ex parte Moore cannot shirk its own responsibility to 
comply with Atkins merely because the Texas legislature had not codified the rule from Atkins). 
239. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 9–10. It is important to note that not only do most 
intellectually disabled persons fall in the category of mildly disabled persons, but also that those 
who are “higher” on the scale of intellectual disability are almost completely incapable of 
committing capital crimes. Id. at 9 nn.6–7. See also Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5 (noting the 
remark in Atkins that not all of those who seek protection under the Eighth Amendment will be so 
disabled as determined by a national consensus (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 
(2002))); Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 185, at 136 (“The seven criteria of the Briseno 
opinion operationalize an Atkins interpretation that only exempts a subcategory of persons with [an 
intellectually disability] from execution.”). 
240. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 10; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5–6; see also DSM-4, 
supra note 81, at 41 (noting that roughly eighty-five percent of diagnoses fall into the mild 
category). 
241. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 10; see also Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6; DSM-4, 
supra note 81, at 44 (explaining that intellectual disability does not necessarily last throughout 
one’s entire lifetime, as persons who exhibited characteristics of mild intellectual disability via 
academic failure may develop strengths in other adaptive skills if given the right opportunities and 
training). 
242. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 10; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6. 
243. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 10–12; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6–8. 
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Eighth Amendment.244 Indeed, the Atkins Court handed down its rule in 
response to a mildly intellectually disabled petitioner,245 and Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in that case was actually focused on the majority’s 
categorical ban being too far reaching.246 If the scope of protection were 
ever in doubt, the Court recently reprised and confirmed this piece of 
Atkins in Brumfield v. Cain.247 In Brumfield, the Court held that a 
petitioner whose IQ score lies in a range of potential mild intellectual 
disability was improperly denied the chance to acquit himself with 
evidence of that disability.248 Brumfield also explicitly stressed that a 
personality disorder can accompany the adaptive deficits that signal 
intellectual disability, discrediting the opposite implication in Briseno.249 
Ultimately, however, it is the Eighth Amendment itself and the Court’s 
precedent that stands against the CCA’s reasoning in Briseno.250 States 
do not have free reign to demarcate the boundaries of the Amendment’s 
protection as they see fit—to do so would contradict the very object and 
purpose of Atkins.251 
The Briseno factors also deprive defendants of their dignity and 
contravene standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment by relying 
on stereotypes, which leads to unreliable and arbitrary judgments.252 In 
 
244. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 12; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002). 
245. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 12; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308. 
246. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 12–13; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
247. See generally Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015); Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, 
at 13. 
248.  Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2278; Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the ACLU of Texas, in Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 13. 
249. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 13; see also Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2280 (“[A]n antisocial 
personality is not inconsistent with any of the above-mentioned areas of adaptive impairment, or 
with intellectual disability more generally.”); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2004). 
250. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 13–14; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17. 
251. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 14; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 719 (2014) 
(“Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional 
protection.”). 
252. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 14; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) 
(requiring imposition of the death penalty to be carried out in a manner that is not arbitrary); Beck 
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980) (noting that the Court will strike down as invalid any 
procedural rules that render the sentencing process less reliable); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (holding 
that states are limited by the Constitution to create appropriate means of enforcing the Eighth 
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employing seven subjective, stereotypical, and nondiagnostic factors by 
which a factfinder may determine intellectual disability, Briseno allows 
judges to define it on a case-by-case basis and inherently tends toward 
unreliability.253 Importantly, the CCA utilized the Briseno factors to 
bolster its holding that Moore was not intellectually disabled, 
emphasizing the very same type of unacceptable subjective and anecdotal 
evidence as reason to reject the habeas court’s recommendation.254 
In sum, Briseno is wholly nonclinical and thus unconstitutional under 
both Atkins and Hall.255 The Atkins Court used scientific and medical 
tools to properly determine whether a defendant was intellectually 
disabled and protected under the Eighth Amendment.256 In Hall, the 
Court revisited Atkins and built upon its holding, stating that “clinical 
definitions of intellectual disability . . . were a fundamental premise of 
Atkins.”257 Under Atkins, any approach that disregards established 
medical practice is flatly out of touch with the Eighth Amendment.258 
IV.  MOORE WILL PROMPT NUMEROUS APPEALS AND MAKE IT MORE 
DIFFICULT FOR STATES TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY, BUT TOTAL 
ABOLITION IS NOWHERE IN SIGHT 
The decision in Moore is one that tightens and clarifies the rules of 
Atkins and Hall and will thereby give states more reason for pause when 
deciding capital cases. The decision will also prompt even more death 
penalty appeals based on intellectual disability, especially in Texas.259 
 
Amendment prohibition of capital punishment for those intellectually disabled persons); Hall, 572 
U.S. at 724 (holding that states cannot deny individuals of their basic dignity, which is protected 
by the Constitution). 
253. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 28; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (stressing that 
factfinders oftentimes failed to view intellectual disability as a mitigating factor, in fact frequently 
leading to harsher punishments). See Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, 
J., dissenting), Lizcano v. State, No. AP–75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, *35 (Tex. Crim. App. May 5, 
2010) (Price, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Ex Parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 28 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Price, J., concurring), for expressions of concern by CCA as well as Fifth 
Circuit judges about the Briseno factors. 
254. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 238, at 29; see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 526–27 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 
255. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 218, at 7. 
256. Id.; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (utilizing the then-current AAMR-9 for the three-
pronged definition of intellectual disability). 
257. Hall, 572 U.S. at 720; Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner, supra note 218, at 8. 
258. Hall, 572 U.S. at 720–21; Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 218, at 8. 
259. Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Death-Penalty Symposium: Incremental Victories for 
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The Houston metropolitan area in Harris County alone saw five appeals 
between March and October 2017.260 Based on its death row population, 
the Harris County District Attorney expected six to ten additional appeals 
by the end of 2018.261 The CCA has already stayed several executions 
and remanded others to state habeas courts for further review of 
appropriate evidence as required by Moore.262 Each case is obviously 
different, but if the convictions of these defendants were previously 
upheld based on the rules and framework of Briseno, Texas is likely to 
see a number of death sentences overturned.263 
In fact, the Supreme Court has already vacated the judgment against 
one San Antonio defendant and remanded that case to the Fifth Circuit.264 
More recently, in January 2019, the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded White v. Kentucky for further consideration in light of Moore, 
even though the Kentucky Supreme Court had upheld the petitioner’s 
death sentence in that case five months after Moore was decided.265 And, 
after the Court remanded Moore’s case, the CCA again found that Moore 
was not intellectually disabled.266 Moore appealed again to the Supreme 
Court which held, due in part to the CCA’s continued reliance on the 
Briseno factors, that the CCA was incorrect in finding Moore had not 
shown intellectual disability.267 But, rather than take this opportunity to 
clearly delineate why the CCA’s analysis was insufficient, the Court 
stated that the opinion simply “rests upon analysis too much of which too 
closely resembles what we previously found improper. And extricating 
that analysis from the opinion leaves too little that might warrant reaching 
a different conclusion than did the trial court.”268 
 
Capital Defendants but No Sweeping Change, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2017, 10:58 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-symposium-incremental-victories-capital-
defendants-no-sweeping-change/.  
260. See Brian Rogers, Texas Attorneys Brace for New Death Penalty Appeals After Supreme 
Court Ruling, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 2017, 3:08 PM), 
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Texas-attorneys-brace-for-
new-round-of-death-12271127.php (noting the five appeals in Harris County and ten total appeals 
through all of Texas in the time span from March 28, when Moore was decided, to October 15). 
261. Id. 
262. See, e.g., Ex parte Guevara, No. WR-63,926-03, 2018 WL 2717041 (Tex. Crim. App. June 
6, 2018); Ex parte Long, No. WR-76,324-02, 2017 WL 3616644 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2017). 
263. Rogers, supra note 260; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259. 
264. Weathers v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 315 (2017); Weathers v. Davis, 659 F. App’x 778 (5th Cir. 
2016); see also Rogers, supra note 260 (noting the remand in the Weathers case). 
265. White v. Kentucky, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). 
266. Moore v. Texas, No. 18-443, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Feb. 2, 2019) (per curiam). 
267. Id. at 8 (“[D]espite the court of appeals’ statement that it would ‘abandon reliance on the 
Briseno evidentiary factors,’ it seems to have used many of those factors in reaching its 
conclusion.” (citation omitted) (quoting Ex parte Moore II, 548 S.W.3d 552, 560 (2018))). 
268. Id. at 10. 
2018] The Definition of Intellectual Disability 453 
State’s attorneys desire clear and stable rules, which the Court does not 
currently provide.269 The new rule from Moore will make the death 
penalty more difficult to impose than it already was, especially in states 
that have not imposed legislation to enact the prior rule from Atkins.270 
Federal habeas reviews, like the one in Moore v. Texas, are becoming less 
predictable, making it even more difficult for attorneys to adequately 
defend the states’ cases.271 This is so even though the goal of such habeas 
cases is to leave convictions alone unless there is glaring and egregious 
error that is prejudicial to the defendant.272 Of course, it is a difficult job 
on both sides—fighting for those who are innocent or undeserving of the 
death penalty and fighting to uphold convictions of those who are 
rightfully sentenced—and the tug of war will continue unless the Court 
hands down a broader rule.273 
To that end, the Supreme Court may take more significant steps 
regarding the death penalty in future terms, as this term mainly dealt with 
spot-checks rather than broad rule changes.274 Relatedly, four states 
voted on propositions involving the death penalty, and the result was a 
resounding victory for supporters of capital punishment.275 For example, 
in the November 2016 election, Nebraska voters reversed a repeal of the 
death penalty that the state legislature passed just eighteen months 
prior.276 California’s effort to repeal the death penalty also failed and, 
conversely, its citizens passed a measure that reduces delay in processes 
surrounding execution of death row inmates.277 This will not go 
 
269. Joseph Tartakovsky, Death-Penalty Symposium: In Search of Predictability, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2017, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-
symposium-search-predictability/.  
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. See Kent Scheidegger, Death-Penalty Symposium: Supreme Court Marks Time for a Term 
on Capital Punishment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2017, 4:11 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-symposium-supreme-court-marks-time-term-
capital-punishment (asserting that the death penalty cases, including Moore, were cases that 
primarily corrected individual errors and did not establish new or far reaching rules). 
275. Id. 
276. Id.; Paul Hammel, Nebraskans Vote Overwhelmingly to Restore Death Penalty, Nullify 
Historic 2015 Vote by State Legislature, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 9, 2016), 
http://www.omaha.com/news/politics/nebraskans-vote-overwhelmingly-to-restore-death-penalty-
nullify-historic-vote/article_38823d54-a5df-11e6-9a5e-d7a71d75611a.html. 
277. Scheidegger, supra note 274; Times Editorial Bd., California’s Supreme Court Should Put 
Proposition 66 Out of Its Misery, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
http://beta.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-proposition-66-death-penalty-20170609-
story.html; see also Liliana Segura, The Death Penalty Won Big on Election Day, but the Devil Is 
in the Details, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 11, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/11/11/the-
death-penalty-won-big-on-election-day-but-the-devil-is-in-the-details/. 
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unnoticed if the Supreme Court again addresses national consensus and 
whether application of the death penalty passes muster under the Eighth 
Amendment.278 
The application of the rule from Moore will inevitably involve, as 
Chief Justice Roberts lamented, an expansion of the rule from Hall.279 In 
the eyes of advocacy groups, this is not necessarily a bad thing. But the 
accepted clinical and diagnostic criteria and standards change with time, 
as noted by the arguments of both sides.280 As such, if the criteria for the 
definition of intellectual disability change in the next iteration of the 
AAIDD Manual or DSM, defendants who were convicted under the old 
scheme will raise a new defense that their death sentence now violates 
the Eighth Amendment.281 
The looseness of Moore’s clarification on Atkins and Hall still leaves 
states enough leeway to find themselves in a constitutional dilemma.282 
The Court is doing everything it can to find a middle ground that still 
respects the states’ authority over their own justice systems. However, 
this issue will continue to be litigated as appeals come forth and until the 
Court makes a more sweeping change.283 While the Court clearly did not 
give constitutional authority to professional bodies such as the American 
 
278. Scheidegger, supra note 274. 
279. Id.; see also Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1061 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(noting that this rule can be read to require complete rigidity in reading IQ scores with the full SEM 
range and to disallow any reason for discounting the lower range of an IQ range). 
280. Scheidegger, supra note 274; see also Brief of Amici Curiae, the American Association 
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the Arc of the United States, in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 164, at 27 (“Clinical understanding cannot, of course, be treated 
as if it were fixed in amber, and any requirement for courts to willfully blind their eyes to proven 
advances in scientific understanding is inconsistent with basic Constitutional principles.”). 
281. See Draye, supra note 186 (“As soon as professional associations revise their thinking in 
a manner that would expand the boundaries of intellectual disability, death-row inmates who would 
benefit from the new guidelines will immediately raise Eighth Amendment claims.”). 
282. Scheidegger, supra note 274; see also Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing the majority’s use of the word “disregard” is inappropriate—the CCA fully regarded and 
considered the current clinical standards and chose, as the ultimate factfinder, to lean away); Ex 
parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 26–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[C]ourts should not become so 
entangled with the opinions of psychiatric experts as to lose sight of the basic factual nature of the 
Atkins inquiry: Is this person capable of functioning adequately in his everyday world with 
intellectual understanding and moral appreciation of his behavior wherever he is? . . . In that 
inquiry, we should not turn a blind eye to the inmate’s ability to use society and his environment to 
serve his own needs. And sound scientific principles require the factfinder to consider all possible 
data that sheds light on a person’s adaptive functioning, including his conduct in a prison society, 
school setting, or ‘free world’ community.” (citing United States v. Montgomery, No. 2:11-CR-
20044-JPM-1, 2014 WL 1516147, at *49 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2014); Clark v. Quarterman, 457 
F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 2006))); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) 
(looking to the entire record and considering all functional abilities to make the intellectual 
disability determination). 
283. Scheidegger, supra note 274; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259. 
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Psychiatric Association, their influence is still undeniable.284 In this 
regard, Moore raised as many questions as it answered.285 
In 2015, Justice Breyer laid out the argument for abolition of the death 
penalty in Glossip v. Gross with a dissenting opinion that questioned the 
basic constitutionality of the death penalty.286 Breyer found the 
geographic clustering of the death penalty to be unusual, and he further 
argued it was cruel based on evidence of wrongful convictions, delays in 
executions, and perceived arbitrariness in its administration.287 It is 
likely, though, that the Court is still not ready to move forward and 
address Breyer’s position in one way or another, as most of the recent 
merits cases dealing with the death penalty were heard to grant relief and 
redress gross legal error.288 Even with fewer death sentences and 
executions, the Court continues to be visible in hearing these 
cases—though its reviews may be for appearances only.289 In an even 
more recent denial of certiorari, Hidalgo v. Arizona, Justice Breyer noted 
specifically that Arizona’s system of capital punishment may be 
unconstitutional.290 
The makeup of the Court will also determine its next steps in deciding 
death penalty cases. With Justice Gorsuch replacing the late Justice Scalia 
and Justice Kavanaugh replacing Justice Kennedy, outcomes of cases 
involving intellectual disability may or may not change.291 Hall was 
 
284. Scheidegger, supra note 274. 
285. Id. 
286. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Steiker 
& Steiker, supra note 259 (discussing the legislative landscape on the death penalty leading up to 
Glossip). In the decade leading up to Glossip, seven states had legislated the death penalty out of 
existence, executions in other states had decreased by eighty percent, and death sentences had 
decreased by ninety percent since their peak in the mid-1990s. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259. 
287. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755–77; see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259 (“The latter 
point has been of particular concern to Breyer, who has noted the suffering caused by prolonged 
death-row incarceration as well as the ways in which delay undercuts the deterrent and retributive 
rationales of the death penalty.”). 
288. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259 (describing the cases as very fact specific and the 
lack of breadth in the Court’s opinions). 
289. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259 (noting the trend over the past forty years of the 
Supreme Court reviewing a disproportionate amount of death penalty cases—four were reviewed 
in 2016, and there were only thirty death sentences and twenty executions); Kevin Barry, The Death 
Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV. 383, 418 (2017) (outlining the two-pronged 
objective and subjective inquiries that may be considered by the Court, if it addresses the broad 
question of constitutionality of the death penalty). 
290. Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1055 (2018) (denying certiorari). See also Adam 
Liptak, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Challenges to Arizona’s Death Penalty Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/supreme-court-death-penalty.html (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s decision to deny review of the death penalty in Hidalgo v. Arizona). 
291. See Adam Liptak, How Brett Kavanaugh Would Transform the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/us/politics/judge-kavanaugh-
supreme-court-justices.html (noting that although Kavanaugh will likely not extend any additional 
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decided by a bare majority and Moore five to three; all indications point 
to Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh voting with the more conservative 
bloc of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas should this 
issue arise again.292  
Despite the recent poll and ballot measures that have been passed, 
research shows overall public support of the death penalty in America is 
indeed declining along with the rate of actual death sentences and 
executions.293 The Court continued a recent trend of general discomfort 
with the death penalty, reversing most death sentences that it reviewed in 
the October 2016 term.294 The Court ruled in favor of capital defendants 
in five of the six cases; in the sixth, the state prevailed on procedural 
grounds.295 The Court is likely to continue to avoid sweeping decisions 
and concerns about the death penalty such as those Justice Breyer raised 
in Glossip and Hidalgo.296 
Although the Court has not addressed it, the administration of the death 
penalty continues to raise suspicion of uneven and arbitrary 
implementation.297 The Court in Moore has tangentially attempted to 
curb the arbitrariness by condemning pervasive junk science practices, 
such as those used by Texas, that began to appear after Atkins.298 Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion addresses issues in many current outstanding Atkins 
claims that are matriculating through the appeals process.299 However, it 
will remain to be seen what effect, if any, this will have on more recent 
 
protections via categorical exemptions from the death penalty, that does not necessarily mean the 
Court’s recent rulings will be overturned). 
292. See Scheidegger, supra note 274 (noting Justice Gorsuch’s votes after he was confirmed 
tend to show he will uphold “law and order” as Justice Scalia’s replacement); McAllister, supra 
note 175 (noting the four justices comprising the liberal wing—Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and 
Sotomayor—do not support the way the death penalty is imposed and attaching great import to the 
effect future shifts in the makeup of the Court may have on possible abolition). 
293. Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, 105 GEO. 
L.J. 661, 663–64 (2017); Kenneth Williams, Why the Death Penalty Is Slowly Dying, 46 SW. L. 
REV. 253, 253–54 (2017); Kenneth Williams, Why and How the Supreme Court Should End the 
Death Penalty, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (2017). 
294. See McAllister, supra note 175 (noting the Supreme Court’s frequent lack of deference to 
state court decisions). The Court reversed four of the six death penalty cases in its 2016 term, with 
one case affirmed in spite of procedural issues that are not strictly pertinent only in context of the 
death penalty. Id. 
295. Id. 
296. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 259. 
297. Brian Stull, Death-Penalty Symposium: The Court Keeps Treating a Fatally Diseased 
Death Penalty, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2017, 4:14 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/death-penalty-symposium-court-keeps-treating-fatally-
diseased-death-penalty/; see Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court is just “patch[ing] up the death penalty’s legal wounds one at a time”). 
298. Stull, supra note 297. 
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death sentences.300 Recently heard appeals come from cases decided in 
1980,301 1986,302 and 1997303—years in which there were 173, 301, and 
265 death sentences rendered, respectively.304 These older cases from a 
bygone era will continue to come up against these new stringencies being 
placed upon the death penalty.305 The Court, in reviewing and possibly 
overturning these cases, may find itself forced to confront larger issues 
that plague the capital punishment system. 
As a result of Moore, evolving standards will likely become even more 
difficult to define and determine.306 Indeed, evaluating evolving 
standards of decency was already troublesome—once a new standard is 
determined, its precedential value makes it less flexible and more difficult 
to adjust.307 The Court’s “evolving standards” test will continue to take 
on more weight, meaning, and guidance from nonlegal sources.308 The 
Court in Moore has come almost full circle from its rule in Atkins, which 
only minimally utilized clinical and professional opinions and primarily 
focused on state attitude and legislation.309 In Hall, the Court more 
seriously considered the criteria of experts, but still hedged as to the 
amount of deference to be given.310 In addition to relying on professional 
guidance more heavily, the Hall Court appeared to twist the mode in 
which it relies on state practice as well, by claiming forty-one total states 
would have disagreed with the Florida Supreme Court.311 Indeed, this is 
correct by way of negative inference, but it drew a shaky equivalence 
between the states that do not have the death penalty at all and those that 
do have the death penalty but properly interpret IQ scores for the purpose 
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have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is 
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
331 (1989))). But see generally Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). 
310. Draye, supra note 186; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710 (2014) (“This [i.e., 
utilizing professional guidelines] in turn leads to a better understanding of how the legislative 
policies of various States, and the holdings of state courts, implement the Atkins rule.”). 
311. Hall, 572 U.S. at 716. 
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of determining intellectual disability.312 
If there are more disagreements among professional associations in the 
future, the Court will likely again confront a changing national 
consensus.313 Switching from states’ practices to the APA’s intellectual 
disability definition does not change the innate paradigm—just like 
states, experts are not always unanimous314—although the proclamation 
of an official statement or handbook gives the appearance of 
unanimity.315 And again, if these “evolving standards” are ever 
reconsidered by the professional community, the Court’s locking them 
into a rule of law may prevent them from changing their position.316 
However, professional organizations such as the APA are not actually 
bound by the Court’s precedent, leaving them free to utilize their 
expertise to reconsider appropriate standards and criteria drafting new 
editions of clinical manuals.317 
CONCLUSION 
Moore v. Texas is a continuation and extension of the Supreme Court’s 
recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and it rightfully strengthens its 
protection for the class of intellectually disabled persons that was 
originally granted in Atkins v. Virginia and further clarified by Hall v. 
Florida. The Court does not require that the Constitution kowtow to 
professional or medical communities for determinations of a national 
consensus. Rather, Moore mandates that courts are not free to disregard 
current established medical standards in their legal determination of 
intellectual disability, as this creates the unacceptable risk that 
intellectually disabled persons might be executed. The rule from Texas’s 
precedent in Ex parte Briseno, with its roots in subjectivity, stereotype, 
and its logical dismissal of the guarantee of Atkins, creates a framework 
under which intellectually disabled persons can be sentenced to death and 
is therefore unconstitutional. As such, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals violated the Eighth Amendment by discounting the proper 
standard error of measurement for Moore’s IQ score and precluding him 
from presenting additional evidence of intellectual disability. 
 
312. Draye, supra note 186. 
313. Id. (“Deciding which opinion to follow is a task better suited to the legislative process than 
to the judiciary.”). 
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